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This thesis discusses how to select alternative methods
for resolving contract disputes other than the traditional
disputes methods which are available under the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978. The thesis first presents the different
alternative disputes resolution techniques, (ADR) . The
various processes are broken into those methods which may be
used within DoD and those methods which are currently not
usable for a variety of reasons.
From there, the thesis introduces a list of case criteria
which are relevant to choosing an appropriate ADR method. The
criteria were compiled from a number of references in the ADR
field. The criteria are then matched to appropriate ADR
choices using a matrix. Only the usable ADR choices are
analyzed for selection.
Finally, the reader is given a simple step by step guide
using the matrix. The guide assists the reader in choosing
whether to use an ADR method, and which method to choose if
ADR is used. The final choice of method is based on analysis
of the case criteria and matching the criteria with the right
method or methods in the matrix tables provided.
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Contract disputes are currently settled using the
procedures in the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) . This
law allows DoD contractors the option of using either the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or the U.S.
Claims Court to settle the disputes. The methods for
resolving contract disputes are incorporated into the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
.
Contractors and contracting officers may have difficulty
with the CDA's procedures. First, the process is time-
consuming. Worse, the legal formalities often pit contractors
and the Government against each other in win-lose contests,
creating situations which can harm long term relationships.
Finally, the cost of settling claims may be much higher than
the value of the claim.
Industry faces many of the same problems. Within the
private sector, companies have used other dispute resolution
methods as alternatives to expensive, adversarial and lengthy
court battles. Companies are often willing to waive some
legal safeguards and risk a measure of uncertainty to gain
expedient, more cordial solutions.
These alternatives are known collectively as alternative
disputes resolution methods or ADR. ADR's basic options
include adjudication, arbitration, mediation, fact-finding,
and negotiations. Numerous variations and hybrids of these
basic five procedures have been developed by industry and more
recently the Government. This has given the field of disputes
resolution a much larger portfolio of options to use in
settling disputes.
The number of cases being taken to the Boards of Contract
Appeals and the United States Claims Court has been growing
steadily. This has prompted some Federal agencies to look at
the ADR field for solutions to overcrowding and long delays
in the traditional system. However, there is not much
guidance to the contracting officers on the various methods
available and how to choose an appropriate ADR method for a
given type of dispute. This thesis will analyze ADR methods
applicable to DoD in resolving contractor/Government disputes.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis has three main objectives. They are as
follows:
1. Provide information on the specific ADR methods
which have been developed both in industry and
the Government. This will include descriptions
of the method, and its advantages and
disadvantages.
2. Develop a set of dispute criteria which may be
used to choose an appropriate ADR method.
Develop a guide for the contracting officer which
will help him/her choose a method of dispute
resolution for a given contract dispute. This
guide will match the criteria with the different
ADR methods and recommend the most appropriate
method (s) to use.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
1. Primary Research Question
What are the best ADR methods for resolving




a. What are the recognized ADR methods and their
characteristics?
b. What are the key criteria of disputes that must
be considered in choosing an appropriate ADR
method?
c. What is the best ADR method (s) to use
given specific dispute criteria.
D. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis is to provide a guidebook for
contracting officials on the most appropriate ADR method or
methods to use given specific criteria.
The areas focused upon included:
1. A general description of ADR including its
advantages and disadvantages to orient the reader
to the general field.
2
.
A description of the traditional contract dispute
methods as described in the CDA and the FAR.
3. Background on pertinent legal statutes and
interpretations that restrict or control the use
of certain ADR methods within the Department of
Defense.
Identification of the specific ADR methods which
have been developed. These methods are defined.
The process is explained using examples and a
brief development history as appropriate.
Processes suitable for DoD contract disputes are
presented separately from those which are not
suitable.
Development of criteria which will provide a
structure for choosing between alternative
methods.
Analysis of the ADR methods which are appropriate
for settling contract disputes within DoD using
criteria.
Development and presentation of a guide which
recommends the appropriate ADR method or methods
to use if a case has a given set of criteria. In
some cases, more than one method is appropriate.
The areas which were excluded include the following:
There was no analysis of ADR methods which were
inappropriate for DoD contract disputes. The
thesis did provide some background on the excluded
methods and the reasons for the exclusion.
There was no attempt to describe more than the
general ADR processes and their hybrids. Each
agency and corporation which uses these techniques
has a slightly different variation on the basic
procedure, since one of ADR's attributes is it's
flexibility. Describing all variations was not
feasible or relevant.
There was no attempt to guide the contracting
official in choosing which criteria pertained to
his/her specific case. In some cases, there must
be legal or other expert advice to decide if a
particular characteristic is pertinent. For
example, witness credibility may be important in
some cases. This is a judgement call on the part
of the agency, not a choice defined in this
thesis.
There was no attempt to generate empirical data.
Only existing information was used.
E. LIMITATIONS
The study is limited by one main factor. There is almost
no empirical data available which matches up the specific
criteria of a dispute with the different ADR methods. The
empirical data which are available are usually restricted to
one or two well known methods, and are very limited in scope,
or deal predominantly with criteria which will guarantee a
certain outcome, instead of an appropriate choice of method.
Therefore, the guide was developed using primarily non-
empirical data. This means the recommendations and
conclusions are a compilation of the general consensus in the
field concerning how to choose a method. Data accuracy is
dependent on expert consensus, not on quantifiable figures.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis was written under the following assumptions:
1. The reader has a need for a practical guide to ADR
and how to choose ADR methods. This assumes that
his agency chain of command is not actively
opposed to the use of ADR.
2. The user has additional legal expertise available.
G. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Approximately 115 books, articles, reports and hearings
were reviewed during this research. Of these, 65 were
actually referenced. Only 10 references contained empirical
data. The references containing empirical data are listed
separately in Appendix A.
The literature search concentrated on information
available from the private and public agencies that specialize
in ADR research, use and consulting. Almost all of the data
were provided by practitioners and researchers in the field
and included:
1. General books on the different ADR methods.
2 . Current magazine articles, predominantly contained
in legal publications. Here, legal and general
data bases were invaluable.
3
.
Research papers and various studies done mostly
by or for Government agencies, such as the
Department of Justice and the US Army Corps of
Engineers. A great number of documents were
obtained from an ADR sourcebook put out by the
Administrative Conference of the United States.
4. Training material put together by the Corps of
Engineers, the Air Force and several private
institutions such as Harvard University.
5. Hearings on ADR held by the Committee on the
Judiciary in the House of Representatives.
6. Transcripts of interviews with several key agency
representatives on their agency use of ADR.
H. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in developing this thesis was as
follows:
1. The research question was chosen.
2. An initial literature review using commercial data
bases and library materials was conducted. The
results were disappointing.
A number of specialized sources were contacted.
These sources included Federal agencies who had
used or researched ADR, legal counsels, Senate
and House of Representative staffers, ADR
information clearinghouses and private ADR
consultants. These agencies collectively
provided about 100 separate references.
An intense literature review was conducted, in
coordination with on-site research at several
information clearinghouses in the Washington DC
area. Three key Government agencies were
contacted and personnel interviewed to help
clarify certain issues in the literature.
Information was compiled on all available ADR
methods. The ones which were not suitable for DoD
contracting disputes and the scope of this thesis
were discussed, but not analyzed. This included
most binding ADR procedures which are illegal in
DoD, several procedures which clearly do not apply
to Government contracting and all pre-dispute
procedures.
A list of criteria was compiled for each
appropriate ADR method. This was done by
screening the literature for clear
recommendations based on technical expertise in
the field, and in a limited number of references,
empirical studies which matched criteria with
specific procedures.
Criteria were matched with the appropriate ADR
method or methods. This was accomplished by
reviewing the literature for recommended matches
and models. Most of the data were non-empirical.
The small amount of empirical data which were
available were often highly concentrated and very
narrow in focus, or did not cover a large sample.
For that reason, it was not weighted more heavily
in the compilation of data, particularly since the
available empirical data did not contradict non-
empirical data.
A data matrix was developed which matched the ADR
method to the criteria, based on the amount of
consensus in the literature. Criteria had either
a positive or negative match to the different
methods, depending on whether they favored
selection or deletion of a method. The matrix
showed the number of times positive and negative
matches occurred in the literature.
9. These data were further analyzed. The matrix was
simplified and divided into several tables which
were designed to help the contracting officer
choose an appropriate ADR method.
10. ADR methods were analyzed and grouped based on
criteria developed in the tables. This was done
to help the contracting officer mentally
categorize the procedures, and show certain trends
in the different methods.
11. Final conclusions were presented. The three
research questions were answered. A guide for the
contracting officer was presented, with
information on how to use the tables to select an
ADR method. The guide sets forth a number of
steps to assist the contracting officer in the
different decisions involved in ADR selection.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter will discuss the background of alternative
disputes resolution methods or ADR. First, ADR will be
defined. Next, a short history of ADR in the Government will
be presented, followed by information on the traditional
contract disputes methods under the Contract Disputes Act of
1978. Finally, legal background will be presented to orient
the reader to the legal issues surrounding the use of ADR.
A. BACKGROUND ON ADR
Alternative disputes resolution is broadly defined as any
alternative to the traditional court system. Within the
Government, since agencies are subject to the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978, this definition can be expanded to
encompass alternatives to the formal Board of Contract Appeals
proceedings as well as the courts.
The use of alternatives to the court system has been
around for a long time. Most of the procedures incorporate
mediation, negotiation or arbitration in different formats.
All three have been used in various guises for centuries.
For example, mediation was commonly used in colonial New
England [11:3]
Recently, there has been a reawakening of interest in
alternatives to litigation. The 1960 's were characterized by
a growth of litigation. Times were troubled, new legislation
involving areas like civil rights created more opportunities
for court actions, and traditional mediating institutions such
as the churches and families were breaking down. [11:4]. A
concentrated search for alternatives began. A number of
institutions, such as the National Center for Dispute
Settlement and the Center for Public Resources, were created
to study the demand for alternatives. [11:4-5] New processes
such as the mini-trial were developed by industry, while older
methods such as arbitration were reexamined for newer uses.
Although certain types of ADR such as arbitration had been
used in the private sector for many years, ADR spread more
slowly within the Federal Government. In the past decade,
since the passage of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, the
increasing burden on the Boards of Contract Appeals, as well
as the courts, has motivated some agencies to search for ways
to offload the formal process. Leaders in the field include
the Environmental Protection Agency, the US Army Corps of
Engineers, and more recently the Department of the Navy.
The search has been for new and creative ways to resolve
conflicts. Some methods involve resolution before the problem
escalates by involving interested parties in the rulemaking
process, or regularly discussing potential problem areas.
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Other methods involve the use of third party neutrals who help
to mediate, arbitrate or negotiate solutions. This
fascinating field is characterized by innovation, and the
growth of hybrid techniques tailored for the agency's special
needs.
B. ADVANTAGES OF ADR
The interest in ADR within DoD, is caused by a number of
factors which are listed below. They include the following:
1. ADR is a voluntary process within DoD. When
parties choose to use ADR, it is because they want
to do so, not because they are forced into a set
process. This often creates a better atmosphere
for settling differences, because the parties can
choose the forum and often the time and place.
2. The processes are flexible. There are currently
a large number of ADR processes which give
managers a choice of forum, tailored to suit the
individual case needs. Most of the methods are
internally flexible to a degree. In other words,
within a general framework, the details of the
process are left to the disputing parties. Some
of the common details which may be left to the
parties include time limits, place, if witnesses




The procedures used are faster than the formal
court or board processes. How much faster is
dependent on the dispute's history and the
willingness of the parties to settle. The length
of time almost always leads to lower court costs,
lower interest costs and lessens expensive
disruption of operations.
4 ADR is an important alternative when the
contractual arrangement does not end with the
dispute. The adversarial atmosphere of a court
room is not conducive to good long-term




ADR methods allow managers to retain control over
the process. In most of the methods, decision
making authority is retained by the parties.
Since the parties can explore the underlying
problems as well as the actual initial dispute,
and determine the solution, ADR decisions tend to
hold up over time. [45:41]
C. DISADVANTAGES OF ADR
ADR had disadvantages as well. Certain situations do not
lend themselves well to any ADR process. As in any system,
there are certainly potential pitfalls. These disadvantages
include the following:
1. The use of ADR is considered inappropriate by many
experts in areas that involve only a question of
law or in cases which would set precedent for a
number of other cases. [18:2] It should be clearly
understood that ADR is not a substitute for the
courts, since in certain cases, it would not be
appropriate to have informal settlement. Rather,
it is a method to offload the existing court
system, allowing cases which require litigation
to have their day in less congested courts.
2. ADR is primarily a voluntary procedure. DoD
contracting officials need contractor approval and
internal agency approval to pursue alternatives.
Since ADR is still a relatively unknown field, one
or both parties may be reluctant to break away
from the conventional dispute resolution path.
This could be a major problem for contracting
officials attempts to use ADR. The tendency in
the Government and dealing with the Government is
to use established procedures, which could make
the initial use of ADR difficult in agencies not
yet piloting ADR programs.
3. Another potential disadvantage is that ADR will
simply add another layer to an already cumbersome
process. [42: 12] Critics can point to the current
disputes process, which allows the contractor to
choose between four forums. Few choose the
accelerated and expedited procedures, and the
boards are almost as judicial as the court,
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because of the limited potential for appeal. The
fear is that other ADR methods may become too
institutionalized, and create even more of a
burden on the system as they become more formal
.
Linked to this problem is the fear that ADR may
allow some dishonest contractors to stretch out
the process because they do not want expedient
settlement.
Parties are reluctant in some cases to embark on
a process which may end in the courts anyway.
Agency rules often stifle a 'final decision' by
subjecting it to numerous review layers. [37 : 2]
The contracting officials that use ADR to settle
disputes must work within the framework of the
agency to ensure that the final decision is made
by someone empowered to obligate the agency.
Agencies are bound by restrictions that do not
encumber private industry. Government processes
are controlled by statutes like the Freedom of
Information Act, the Competition in Contracting
Act and the Administrative Procedures Act, as well
as annual funding restrictions and internal
regulations. [37 : 2 ] Some ADR types are actually
prohibited by interpretation of one or more
statutes. {26:3] All ADR reviews for potential
use must include allowances for a large number of
statutes.
Some Government officials feel that ADR may reduce
the accountability of Government of ficials. [42 : 9]
This could be done by allowing some of the
decision making authority, even indirectly, to be
handed over to third party neutrals. This is of
particular concern with ADR that uses binding
decisions from a third party neutral, although
this is currently not allowed within DoD.
D. BACKGROUND ON CONTRACT DISPUTES
The Government has attempted to solve disputes
administratively as well as judicially for many years.
Beginning in 1868, the courts allowed the Secretary of War to
settle a claim with a board. [12:M-1-1] Boards were
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occasionally used to settle claims, from then on, for about
7 years. During World War II, to expedite the war effort,
boards became widely used. [50:602]
In 1877, Congress passed the Tucker Act, which waived
sovereign immunity on express or implied-in-fact contracts.
[15:17-2] Basically, this allowed contractors to bring suit
against the Government for anything expressly stated in a
contract, or implied by extrinsic evidence. [6:21]
The initial rights of contractors to use the courts were
limited under the Tucker Act. Contractors were required to
exhaust all administrative remedies before they could use the
courts. Then, they could use the courts only in cases of fact
where fraud was involved. [6:2]
For years, the courts upheld this view. In 1951, the
Supreme Court overruled a Court of Claims decision which
granted relief to a contractor on the basis that the agency's
decision was arbitrary and capricious. The landmark case was
the US v. Wunderlich . It firmly established that judicial
relief would be granted only for fraud. The Supreme Court
wrote "...If the standard of fraud we adhere to is too
limited, that is a matter for the Congress...". Congress
obligingly countered by passing the Anti-Wunderlich Act in
1954.
The Act allowed the courts to grant relief to contractors
for four reasons in addition to fraud, for matters-in-fact.
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Contractors could now appeal decisions which were arbitrary,
capricious, not supported by substantial evidence or so
grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith. The Act also
permitted review for matters-in-law. [55: 150]
Following the passage of the Anti-Wunderlich Act, the
Government adopted a disputes clause for its contracts. The
clause basically stated that:
1. Disputes on factual matters shall require a
contracting officer's final decision (COFD) which
will be rendered in a reasonable amount of time.
2. The contractor must appeal in writing within 3
days.
3. Appeals are heard based on Anti-Wunderlich Act
standards.
4. Pending a final decision, the contractor must
continue to work. [55: 149]
This clause created some problems. These are worth
exploring, since the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) , was
passed to correct these faults.
1. The contractor had to exhaust all administrative
remedies before he was allowed to go to the
courts. [19:1-2]
2. The contractor was not allowed to introduce de
novo (new) evidence to the court. In a decisive
case in 1963, the Supreme Court held that new
evidence could not be introduced in an appeal.
Based on the ruling, courts could only review
existing records. This put great pressure on the
boards to protect Government and contractor
rights. As a result, boards became more formal.
[6:2]
3. Jurisdiction was limited to matters arising under
the contract. The contractor could only seek
relief from a COFD when the contract provided a
specific remedy-granting clause. The courts
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often dismissed claims involving other areas such
as Government breach of contract, because of a
lack of jurisdiction. [5:603]
4. Board actions were very slow. The old disputes
procedures contained no provisions for expeditious
settlement of small claims.
5. COFDs could take quite a while because of the
range of interpretations concerning the
'reasonable time' allotted to the contracting
officer. [6:198]
6. There was no Government right of appeal to a board
decision. Early on, the courts decided that the
Government could not appeal a ruling against
itself. [12:M-l-8]
Many legislators felt a change was needed. In the closing
days of the 95th Congress, a bill was introduced and became
law. It was the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. Unfortunately,
legislators introduced numerous changes at the last minute
with little or no debate. Consequently, Congress incorporated
these changes piecemeal into the CDA, without all of the
recorded discussion that usually documents Congressional
intent. The lack of documentation has caused some
interpretation problems. [17:2]
E. CURRENT CONTRACT DISPUTES PROCEDURES
Disputes on all contracts entered into after 1 March, 1979
are resolved within the guidelines of the Contract Disputes
Act of 1978 (CDA)
.
Disagreements over claims arise in many contracts. Often,
the contracting officer and the contractor can informally
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resolve the disagreement. In fact, the intent of Congress,
documented in the legislative history of the current disputes
procedures, is that contracting officers will settle
informally whenever possible. When they cannot, the
disagreement becomes a dispute. [4 :981]
To begin the formal dispute process, the contractor will
submit a written claim for a contracting officer's final
decision (COFD) . The contracting officer reviews the dispute
and renders a COFD in writing. The COFD is issued within 60
days if the claim is under $50,000. In cases over $50,000,
the contracting officer will issue a decision within 60 days,
or tell the contractor when the decision will be issued.
[17:4]
The contractor must certify that all claims over $50,000
are in good faith, and that the claim and supporting documents
are accurate, complete, and reflect only what the Government
owes the contractor. [55:151]
The courts have determined that claims including quantum
(money) must specify the amount of money requested in order
to qualify for a COFD. This stems from the certification
requirement. Unless the contracting officer has a value, he
cannot determine whether the claim must be certified. The
exceptions to the rule are claims requesting non-monetary
relief, such as a request for excusable delay. [4:978]
The contractor cannot appeal until he/she receives a
contracting officer's final decision. There is one exception.
When a contracting officer fails to provide a COFD in a
reasonable time period, it is construed as a denial of the
claim. At that point, the contractor may begin the appeal.
DoD contractors may choose between administrative and
judicial remedies on appeal. They can go before the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) if they file within
90 days. Contractors can appeal board decisions on matters of
law, but decisions are final on matters-in-fact, except when
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, grossly
erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence. Board
appeals may be submitted to the US Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and in rare instances to the Supreme Court.
[4:1012]
Alternately, contractors may file a direct appeal with the
US Claims Court within one year. [51:2] The contractor may
appeal Court decisions to the US Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in accordance with the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, with additional appeal allowed to the
Supreme Court if they elect to take the case. Decisions on
matters in fact will only be set aside if found to be 'clearly
erroneous'. [4:1014]
At any time during the disputes procedure, the contracting
officer may attempt to negotiate a settlement. If
18
negotiations are reopened, a COFD is in jeopardy of losing
finality. [4:984]
The CDA extended the jurisdiction for the ASBCA and other
Boards of Contract Appeals (BCA) to all claims related to the
contract, as well as those arising from the contract. Claims
do not need to be covered by a specific clause to be valid.
Consequently, the disputes process now covers breach of
contract, reformation and rescission issues, as well as the
more traditional areas like equitable adjustments and
constructive changes. [55: 151]
.
The CDA calls for two additional procedures, designed to
speed up resolution of small claims. For expedited claims
under $10,000, the contractor may request a decision by a
single member of the BCA within 120 days if possible. An
alternative for claims under $50,000 is the accelerated
process. Accelerated cases must be resolved, whenever
possible, within 180 days. There is no judicial review of a
small claim decision, except in cases of fraud. Note that the
Wunderlich safeguards on arbitrary or capricious decisions,
etc. do not exist under the small claims process. [51:3]
Other changes implemented under the CDA include:
1. The Government has the right to seek review of a
decision.
2. Simple interest, at the Treasury rate, accrues on
a contractor claim, from the day of Government
receipt, not the day the COFD is rendered.
[55:151]
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3. The Court can consolidate all claims involving the
same contract, as part of its 'housekeeping'
authority. [17:8]
4. The contractor may be paid if the court renders
a partial judgement on the case, pending final
resolution. [17:8]
The disputes process does not cover all cases. First, the
Act specifically excludes real property, certain TVA
contracts, non-appropriated fund contracts, contracts with
foreign agencies and maritime contracts which do not carry a
disputes clause. [6:22]
Next, under the umbrella of the Tucker Act, only implied
in-fact not implied in-law contracts are covered by the
disputes process. The guidance for the difference is as
follows:
The fundamental difference between a contract 'implied in
fact' and one 'implied in law' is not necessarily whether
there has, or has not, been a written instrument executed
between the parties. The true criterion is that a
contract 'implied in fact' rests upon consent implied from
facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to
contract, whereas in one 'implied in law 1 consent is
lacking , being forced upon the parties by law, sometimes
even in the teeth of their express contract. [6:21]
Therefore, certain disagreements are excluded from the
disputes process because they are by nature implied in
law. [6:21]
Another basic area excluded from the disputes process is
fraudulent claims, although the courts have taken cases
involving partial fraud by severing the fraudulent portion
from the other parts of the claim. In some cases, the boards
will continue to process the claim when there is doubt about
the Government allegation of fraud. These cases are rare.
The usual procedure is to suspend proceedings in cases of
alleged fraud. [4:956]
FAR 33.210 and the CDA also forbid the contracting officer
from settling disputes under other agency regulation or
statutes. The FAR states:
...This authorization does not extend to a) A claim or
dispute for penalties or forfeitures prescribed by statute
or regulation that another Federal agency is specifically
authorized to administer, settle or determine...
[61:33.210]
For instance, Davis-Bacon wage disputes are settled by the
Department of Labor, outside of the contracting officer's
jurisdiction. [4:983]
Finally, the disputes process will not process claims
which are primarily in tort. [4:954] Basically, a tort is an
act which violates a basic freedom of an individual such as
freedom from injury to himself, his property, or his
reputation. Torts protect basic freedoms; contract law
protects the interests of deliberately agreed on promises.
The courts will hear the case only if a contract agreement is
involved, as well as a basic freedom. [42:150-151]
F. ADVANTAGES OF THE CURRENT PROCESS
The current disputes process, first and foremost, allows
everyone access to due-process of law, with the sole exception
of the accelerated and expedited procedures. Contractors can
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elect direct access into the court system, which protects
their rights on an equal footing with the Government. The
Government can appeal board decisions to the courts, which it
could not do under the old disputes process. The system is
much more equitable. [17:7]
The process also provides an excellent forum for settling
a question of law. Many cases involve the same basic legal
question. Once the courts rule on the case, the ruling sets
a precedent for other similar cases. Although the courts take
time, it is important in our society to know how the laws are
to be interpreted in light of the current trend of thought in
our society. [53:10]
The procedure does allow for accelerated and expedited
procedures, recommended for small claims (under $50,000) not
involving novel questions of law. [17:7] This gives the
contractor the ability to get a dispute resolved quickly, if
he chooses to give up some legal safeguards.
Finally, the courts procedure is necessary for cases
involving many contractors on social issues. Government
acquisition exists to purchase services. It is also used to
further the social and economic goals of the Government. For
example, the role of small business is one of the most
commonly cited social issues, and is applicable to this point.
A major issue concerning small business should be settled by
the courts, so doctrine can be recorded for future cases.
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G. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCESS
Congress made some improvements in the disputes process
with the passage of the CDA. However, the procedure is still
riddled with problems. The following is a discussion of the
major problems concerning contract disputes.
The decision which kicks off the disputes process comes
from the contracting officer. In many cases, the contracting
officer is the same individual who made the decision the
contractor is disputing. If a contracting officer finds for
the contractor, he may be rejecting his own previous decision
that was made in the process of safeguarding the public trust.
The contracting officer is also expected to make rational,
often complex and creative decisions to avoid litigation.
Unfortunately, many contracting officers prefer to use the
disputes process, because it is safer. Otherwise, they may
have to defend their methods and decisions to auditors and
investigators in the Federal Government. [42:1]
Contract disputes may frequently involve highly technical
matters. These cases could get a poor hearing under the
current process. The ASBCA panel members or judges are, by
nature, general ists. They are skilled in the law but may have
to rely too heavily on expert testimony for industry practices
and technical details. [53 : 10]
Since the decision of the boards is usually binding on
matters of fact, the boards have become as formal as the
courts. Hearings are extremely complex in an attempt to
safeguard the rights of the litigants. Few contractors use
the expedited processes anymore, and fewer still represent
themselves before a board. Most contractors use lawyers whose
role is to get the most advantageous settlement possible for
their clients in win-lose battles. Simple issues can turn
into complicated battles. [42:6]
These lengthy battles hurt both the Government and the
contractor. First, the expense uses up resources better
applied elsewhere. Secondly, the delay caused by the process
may harm or destroy the contractor, the ability of the
Government to acquire the good or service, and may even
disrupt critical national missions. [53: Table 1]
H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The following section will provide information on selected
laws which impact on the use of ADR in the government. This
section is intended to give the contracting official some
familiarity with the legal issues to allow him/her a better
understanding of potential challenges and difficulties
associated with the process.
There is general consensus in the literature that the
recognized ADR methods used today are legal, with the possible
exception of binding arbitration and its hybrids. However,
many of the innovators in government agencies are concerned
that they are 'on the edge' using techniques that are not
expressly allowed by statute. This concern was expressed by
Mr Marshall Breger, Chairman of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, in his testimony to the House Committee
on the Judiciary in 1988. He stated that some of the agencies
he dealt with are concerned that the Comptroller General or
the Congress could question their specific authority to use
ADR at any time. [60:69]
Mr. Breger was referring to agency officials who have
pioneered the use of ADR in pilot programs within the
Government. If these officials are concerned, it is
understandable that a contracting officer, unfamiliar with
ADR, would be hesitant to consider its use.
The most serious legal questions raised on the use of ADR
concern the use of arbitration. Binding arbitration is
currently not authorized within DoD. The Comptroller General
as head of the GAO, is responsible for oversight on the
expenditure of public funds. In the last 60 years, the
Comptroller General has issued a number of decisions
prohibiting expenditure of funds for arbitration except where
specifically allowed by statute. Although the GAO has not been
consistent in it's interpretation of statutes, there is
sufficient uncertainty on the legality of using binding
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arbitration to prevent any agency, or contracting officer from
taking a chance. Few would consider chancing a GAO finding
that the agency officers were responsible for illegal,
improper or incorrect payment of Government funds.
GAO opinions are based on several statutes and court
cases. The first is 31 U.S.C., Section 1346, which states,
Except as provided in this section- (1) public money and
appropriations are not available to pay- (A) The pay or
expenses of a commission, council, board, or similar
group, or a member of that group; ... this section does
not apply to (1) commissions, councils, boards, or
similar groups authorized by law. . .
.
Under this law, the Comptroller General has disapproved
arbitration, in some cases, and allowed it in others. [41:10]
Other objections from the Comptroller General have
included the exclusive right to determine claims belongs to
the Comptroller General under the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921, and to the courts under the Tucker Act, the ruling
that the United States Arbitration Act does not cover disputes
involving the US, that an officer who lacks authority to
settle a claim cannot authorize arbitration, and finally that
statutes allowing arbitration imply that absent general
statutory authority, arbitration cannot be used to bind the
Government. [41:13] The GAO added to the uncertainty in ruling
in several cases which allowed arbitration for fact-finding
only, predominantly limiting arbitration to the amount of the
claim. [41:11]
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In these opinions the GAO has wrestled with the question
of authority to arbitrate. Is it desirable or even
constitutional to allow a third party to decide policy and the
expenditure of public funds? In Congressional testimony,
Professor Harold Bruff spoke of the constitutionality of
binding arbitration. He relied extensively on the Supreme
Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) for his first point,
which basically suggested that policy making belongs in the
hand of Government officials. His second point was that
mandatory binding arbitration could be severely tested in the
courts for preventing access to due process of law. His third
point was that arbitration may be disallowed by the courts if
it deals with setting public law norms that are still being
settled. [60:100-102]
The legal analysis reviewed in the literature suggests
that binding arbitration entered into voluntarily, subject to
agency oversight and judicial review, is constitutionally
acceptable within the Government, provided the arbitrator does
not deal with public policy making or setting precedent.
Another important legal question concerning arbitration
lies within the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. The legislative
history of the CDA clearly allows the contracting officer to
explore resolution of contract disputes by negotiation prior
to litigation, and intends to provide a variety of forums for
the contractor. [64] The mandate is so clear that a section
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was added to the Federal Acquisition Regulation which states
in 33.204 that:
It is the Government's policy to try to resolve all
contractual issues by mutual agreement at the contracting
officer's level, without litigation. In appropriate
circumstances, the contracting officer, before issuing a
decision on a claim, should consider the use of informal
discussions between the parties by individuals who have
not participated substantially in the matter in dispute,
to aid in resolving the differences. [61]
Non-binding ADR is conducted under the umbrella of this
clause within DoD. However, it is not interpreted to include
arbitration or its binding hybrids such as binding dispute
panels. Sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Contract Disputes
Act, state that the contractor may go directly to the courts
initially and that matters in law, decided in front of a
board, may not be final or conclusive "notwithstanding any
contract provision, regulation, or rules of law to the
contrary " . This indicates that the Congressional intent was
to bind the parties only within the framework of the CDA, and
not allow a binding agreement outside the statute. [41:21]
In the final analysis, the use of binding arbitration
within DoD in settling contract disputes is so unclear, that
unless the Congress provides clear statutory authority in the
future, it is not an available alternative.
Another legal area to be considered is the legality of the
ADR procedures themselves. The rulemaking and decisional
forums for the Government are laid out in a general statute
called the Administrative Procedures Act. The administrative
hearing is covered in the order or decisional section of the
law, under adjudication. Basically the APA states that "...in
every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing..." there are certain requirements. The hearing
requirements were tested in Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) . In this
case the Supreme Court decided that the hearing must be very
structured, and rather similar to a court to pass a
constitutional test. Although the case has since been diluted
by decisions that the formality of the hearing must be
balanced by the burden on the system, it leaves a question on
what kind of hearings are permissible, including the many
different ADR processes. [28:1410]
One of the benefits of private sector ADR is the
confidentiality issue. Corporations appreciate conducting
their dispute resolution away from the glare of a public
courtroom. However the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and
the general public consensus to conduct 'Government in the
sunshine' disallow the complete confidentiality of ADR
proceedings. This makes the process less attractive to
private corporations and to contracting officials who are
nervous about honestly negotiating their differences for fear
the numerous investigative agencies may criticize their
decisions.
The FOIA requires that the public has access to all final
agency opinions on adjudicated cases including dissenting
opinions. [62] In addition, agency records must be made
available to the public with nine exceptions. The trade
secrets exception covering confidential commercial and
financial information, and the exception on inter-agency
memorandums may preclude release of some ADR material
.
[62]
However, under the FOIA, public decisions and the basis for
the decisions are usually open to the public, which dilutes
the advantage of confidentiality enjoyed by private sector
use of ADR.
The final statute which must be considered is the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) . CICA impacts
on the hiring of third party neutrals, when required. If the
retainer is under $25,000, FAR 13.106 requires quotations,
usually oral, from a reasonable number of sources to ensure
competition. Contracts over $25,000 require full and open
competition, unless one of the seven exceptions in U.S.C. 41,
Section 253 apply.
This requirement for competition must be recognized and
handled, especially when the process calls for the joint
appointment of a neutral or neutrals by the contractor and the
Government. One way to deal with the situation is to establish
rosters of acceptable neutrals. Another would be to request
waivers for full and open competition. However it is done,
the competition requirement must be recognized and planned for
in any process that involves a third party.
Currently, the Senate is considering a bill that would
amend certain statutes to make it easier for Government
agencies to use ADR, including arbitration. The bill provides
for the following:
1. Encourages and authorizes agency use of proven
alternatives to litigation, including arbitration,
and further encourages agencies to develop
additional techniques. The authorization requires
the agency to consider the case in view of
precedent or policy considerations, need for a
full public record, and impact on parties who are




Requires that each agency appoint a dispute
resolution specialist and provide ADR training to
appropriate personnel.
3. Requires standard contract, grant and other
agreements be rewritten to encourage the use of
ADR. This section includes amendments to the FAR.
4. Amends Section 556(c) title 5, from the
Administrative Procedures Act to include ADR.
This amendment would lift any questions on the
permissible format for a hearinq.
5. Specifically allows the use of private neutrals.
6. Grants that neutrals and documents used during an
ADR process will be confidential for other
proceedings, with a few exceptions such as
criminal investigations or with the consent of
both parties.
7. Authorizes arbitration by statute.
8. Requires an annual report to the Conqress, to be
compiled by the Administrative Conference of the
US.
9. Authorizes the Administrative Conference of the
United States to compile and maintain a roster of
neutrals.
10. Amends the CDA to clarify Congressional intent to
allow ADR to be used within its framework.
I. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
Alternate dispute resolution techniques are being explored
in the public sector because they offer a variety of benefits,
including lower costs, more control by managers, faster
procedures and more flexibility. However, they are
inappropriate in some cases, such as those requiring
precedent, and are difficult to use initially because of the
lack of experience in using many of the processes correctly,
within the framework of numerous regulations and statutes.
Currently, DoD officials use the procedures specified in
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 almost exclusively. The CDA
corrected many of the problems inherent in the disputes
process. However, the CDA is predominantly a judicial process
with many of the disadvantages inherent in such a process,
such as adversarial proceedings and long waiting times.
ADR provides some answers to the problems in the CDA
processes. No one procedure provides solutions to all
problems, but different ADR methods allow the manager and
legal officials to key on and correct selected deficiencies.
ADR selections are restricted by certain statutes, and
interpretations of the statutes. Binding decisions by a third
32
party neutral outside the Government are forbidden under
existing statutes. Other non-binding methods are restricted
in matters of privacy, and the hiring of third party neutrals.
Finally, there are unresolved issues concerning the format of
acceptable hearings as required by statute under the
Administrative Procedures Act. However, it should be noted
that most forms of non-binding ADR have been unchallenged.
They may even be encouraged under broad interpretations of the
directive in the FAR for the contracting officer to use
informal settlement whenever possible.
III. DATA PRESENTATION
A. GENERAL
Chapter III will present data on the different ADR methods
contained in current literature. The chapter begins with a
continuum which divides the different methods of ADR into
categories. Next, the ADR processes which can be used in the
specialized field of contract disputes are discussed, followed
by discussions of methods which cannot be used currently in
DoD for various reasons.
B. ADR METHODS
ADR methods are spread across a broad continuum of
specific categories. At one end are informal procedures and
cooperative decision making between disputants, including
identifying procedures to settle potential disputes. From
there, methods become increasingly formal, with the other end
of the spectrum being binding assistance by a third neutral
party. This continuum is very helpful in categorizing the ADR
methods which are currently available. [45: 24] The continuum
chart shown below (Figure 1) is adapted from a chart developed
by Dr. Jerome Delli Priscoli of the US Army Corps of Engineers
and Christopher Moore of CDR Associates. The chart has been
modified to match this thesis by removing relationship
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The first area is cooperative decision making, where the
parties relate directly without assistance. This is the most
commonly used category of ADR, since it encompasses
negotiation. Cooperative decision making is important, because
it allows the parties to handle disputes before they get on
an adversarial track. The processes involved in cooperative
decision making include areas like cooperative problem solving
and negotiations. [45:27]
The remaining areas involve solutions based on third party
assistance. First, a third party may be used to provide
procedural assistance. Procedural assistance is helpful when
the parties have not identified a satisfactory forum for
discussions or cannot decide how to begin talking. A neutral
can help establish an acceptable process, train the
negotiators, help keep the process on track and keep the data
exchange flowing. The processes used here include
facilitation and mediation. [45:30]
A third party may also be used for substantive assistance
when the parties do not agree on the facts, or differ on the
legal interpretations of the contract. The use of a neutral
here, to help interpret the data and/or provide an opinion,
can often break the impasse. Procedures used include mini-
trials, advisory panels, advisory mediation, neutral fact-
finding and settlement conferences. [45:31-34]
Finally, a third party neutral (s) may be used for non-
binding or binding assistance. The neutral makes the decision
after hearing the facts of the case. In non-binding
assistance, the parties can accept the decision completely,
use it to further negotiations, or disregard it totally by
choosing to continue the dispute in court. In binding
assistance, the parties must abide by the decision, subject
to very limited review. Within DoD, binding assistance is not
legally recognized, with the exception of the small claims
ASBCA procedure. Procedures for non-binding assistance
include non-binding arbitration and summary procedures.
Procedures for binding assistance include different types of
binding arbitration, mediation combined with arbitration, and
private judging. [45:34-36]
The following sections will describe the different ADR
methods currently used in Government and industry, beginning
with the cooperative methods as discussed above. The
discussion will include a brief history of the method, if




Negotiation can be defined as "...a problem solving
process in which two or more people voluntarily discuss their
differences and attempt to reach a joint decision on their
common concerns." [45:43] Negotiation is the most commonly
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used form of ADR. In fact, it is the heart and soul of many
of the processes which involve interaction between the
parties, with or without third party assistance.
The art of negotiating has been a part of human
relations throughout history. However, negotiating theory has
become more sophisticated in the past few decades as
businesses and governments searched for better conflict
resolution than provided in the courts. Research in the
subject has revealed a number of new techniques which can
improve negotiations and tailor discussions to specific
situations more effectively.
Negotiations can be generally divided into two
categories. First is the zero-sum approach adopted from game
theory, which assumes that one side's gain will be another
side's loss. The zero-sum approach allows only win-lose
negotiations. In certain cases it may be the only type of
negotiation the situation allows.
Integrative negotiating is the alternate approach.
In public sector negotiations, what appear to be zero-sum
situations may often be integrative, or potential win-win
negotiations once they are reviewed. The integrative method
teaches that parties value certain things more than others,
which allows them to trade off items that are less important
for those that are more important. Integrative bargaining
keys in on positive problem solving and cooperation. It does
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not rely on hardened positional bargaining. Instead, it
allows the parties to explore ways to meet firm goals without
locking them into a single solution. Just as there are
numerous trails to the top of a mountain, the integrative
approach believes there are numerous paths to reach an
objective. [7:85-88]
No one set process exists for negotiations, but the
general process outlined below is a commonly used model. The
model is flexible and can be adjusted to suit the needs of an
agency. It shows the stages most negotiations go through.
All good negotiations begin with effective planning.
Before a claims negotiation begins, the negotiator should
formulate his/her strategy and decide which items are
important and which items are easily conceded. During this
phase, the negotiator should decide the minimum and maximum
ranges he is willing to concede. It is also important to know
as much about the other party as possible. Obviously, if the
negotiator understands his opponent's motives, alternatives,
and organizational culture, the chances of reaching a mutually
agreeable settlement are higher. Finally, the negotiator
should understand all the issues as clearly and factually as
possible. [13:126]
It is important to understand the differences between
positions, interests, rights and power during the preparation
for negotiations. Positions are what people say they want.
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Interests are the things that the parties really care about.
They are the underlying reasons for positions. [3:5] For
example, contractor claims for $35 almost certainly involve
more than just the need for the money, when the contractor is
willing to take it to court. In reality, the contractor may
be interested in being heard out by a third party, or showing
the unreasonableness of a government policy. The key to many
successful negotiations is to determine what the interests
are, and how they can be reconciled in a fair settlement.
Otherwise, other disputes may arise over the same unsettled
interest in the future. [3 : 13
]
Rights are independent standards about fairness or
legitimacy. [3:7] Sometimes they are codified, other times
they are socially accepted standards. The interpretation of
rights is sometimes a matter of dispute. It is difficult to
settle a rights issue if both parties are deeply committed to
their position. Unfortunately, this sort of dispute must
often be resolved by the courts. [3:7]
Power is the ability to coerce. [3:7] Power is an
important issue in understanding negotiations. The situation
may involve actual power, or perceived power. Both influence
the attitude, concessions and behavior of the parties. [3:8]
Short-sighted negotiators may overuse the power issue, and
ultimately end with a settlement that leads to repeated
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disputes and poor relationships for the length of the
contract.
Planning should take into account the different
interest, right and power issues, as well as the formally
written issues and positions. Negotiators should evaluate
acceptable outcomes for their ability to settle interest,
rights and power issues against their transaction costs,
outcome satisfaction, long term effects and possible
recurrence of the problem. [3:11-12]
Once the initial planning is done, the negotiation
process begins with the opening offers. This part of the
negotiation can set the tone for the rest of the negotiation.
It is important not to get locked into an extreme position
early in the game. The psychology of who makes the first
offer is important to opening strategy and should be carefully
considered in the planning stage. [13:128]
Howard Raiffa, in his "Art and Science of
Negotiations " . calls the next stage the 'negotiations dance.
This is the give and take portion of successful negotiations.
During this stage, the negotiator should listen to the
opposite party, make and receive concessions and reassess
positions in a search for mutually acceptable alternatives.
The goal of this stage is to step into the other party's
shoes, and reach towards agreement without compromising the
essential requirements of your own position. [13:128]
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The final stage in negotiations is the end play. It
leads to the final results, if the negotiations end in
agreement. [13: 129] The final agreement should be within a
BATNA, or best alternative to a negotiated agreement. [9: 104]
In successful negotiations, the final agreement should be
acceptable, although not necessarily agreeable to both
parties. Once a commitment is made, the agreement must be
formalized with a contract modification or other official
agreement document. [13:130] In public disputes, settlements
must be within regulatory and statutory limits, and must
safeguard the public trust.
The advantages and disadvantages listed below pertain
to unassisted negotiations. However, most of them also pertain
to assisted negotiation processes.
One of the principal benefits to negotiation is that
the parties control the process. This allows the negotiators
to be flexible in their search for solutions that resolve not
only issues but interests as well. [53:42]
The process control by managers leads to a high rate
of compliance. The parties work out their own solutions.
Underlying issues may be explored and resolved. Parties
commonly leave successful negotiations satisfied that they
influenced an acceptable outcome. [53:42]
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Negotiations also have the potential to generate
faster solutions than the courts, especially when the parties
are motivated to settle by a deadline. [45:45]
As with all processes, there are some barriers to
negotiations. First, negotiations cannot occur if the parties
are unwilling to talk, or are so entrenched in their positions
that they are not willing to concede anything. [45:44] This
seldom occurs early in the dispute. However, positions
characteristically harden as time goes on, making unassisted
negotiations difficult or impossible.
Negotiation is not mandatory. The Government cannot
compel participation, or require settlement. This is a
barrier if the claimant will not negotiate or a binding
settlement is required by the agency hierarchy. It can be
argued that any issues settled during negotiations are
additional issues which won't be litigated. It is risky for
a contract official to undertake negotiations, knowing the
dispute may not settle. In a world of limited resources, it
is hard to justify a long unfruitful negotiation. [53:42]
One party or the other may end up settling for weak
or unbalanced outcomes. [53:42] Certainly, the outcome of
negotiations may hinge on the power of the parties, or the
expertise of the negotiators. Within the Government, it is
risky for an inexperienced contracting official to face
experienced contractor negotiators. It may be equally risky
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for a small contractor to negotiate against the Government.
Many times the parties will end up taking their chances with
the impersonal court system, which they believe will at least
protect their rights if not their interests.
Negotiations are unsuitable for cases which need to
establish precedent or public standards. [53:42] This is the
case with almost any form of ADR. Some cases belong to the
courts because of deep social issues which should be
adjudicated or the potential impact on many interest groups
or cases. In these disputes, the contracting official should
•render unto Caesar' his due right to decide.
2. Facilitation
Facilitation is the use of a third party neutral to
provide procedural assistance or assistance with the process
alone. The facilitator helps negotiating parties communicate.
He/she does not get involved in any substantive issues, but
rather helps the parties sort out their interpretations until
they reach agreement. [53:45] Throughout the negotiations, the
facilitator will remain impartial to the issues. [45:70]
Facilitators are almost exclusively communication
experts. They almost never volunteer an opinion. Instead,
they help set up the process, by ensuring the parties know
their desired outcomes, agenda, meeting place, time
restrictions, participants and rules for any exchanges. Once
the process starts, the facilitator's job is to keep the
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parties moving toward their objectives and help both parties
listen to one another. [7:152]
This process is similar in many respects to mediation.
However a mediator will get involved in the information
exchange between the parties, actively looking and suggesting
compromises based on what the parties have said. The
facilitator does not get involved in the negotiating exchange.
Instead, he keys in on the process and communication aspects
of the negotiation. He keeps the conversation going and
frequently does the recording and monitoring. This allows the
negotiators to give their full attention to the substantive
issues. [45:70]
The facilitation process is much more than just hiring
a person to keep everyone talking and on schedule. There are
a large number of communication skills that the facilitator
can use to improve the quality of the negotiations. The
example below illustrates some of the many techniques a
facilitator could use.
The case was that of proposed subway through an
endangered marsh area. A facilitated negotiation was held
between environmentalists and planners to reach a mutually
agreeable solution to the dispute, which was highly emotional
and quite complex. [7:153]
The facilitator helped the participants reach an
agreeable solution using numerous communication techniques.
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For example, in a problem solving mode, the facilitator teamed
up the designers with the environmentalists, so each could
experience the other's point of view. Another technique
involved opinion surveys between meetings, to clarify the
issues. Ultimately, the groups reached a satisfactory
agreement with the help of the facilitator. [7:157]
There are a number of benefits to facilitation.
First, it will provide an acceptable process or procedure for
parties who cannot agree on how to discuss their differences.
Simultaneously, the procedure will often free the negotiators
from the details of the procedure, such as recording
information and setting up meetings. [45:71]
The process focuses on meeting the procedural and
psychological needs of the parties, as well as the actual
substantive issues. [45:71] For example, many of the wildcat
strikes in the coal industry were started because miners were
not satisfied with the formal arbitration procedure. Their
official forum was unsatisfactory, so the miners resorted to
strikes as a way to express their grievances. There are
certainly similar cases in the contract arena. A facilitated
process can often provide that satisfactory forum for the
parties, and let them reach an agreement. [45:71]
Another benefit to facilitation is that the process
can accommodate numerous parties and their different opinions.
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[45:73] This makes it potentially useful for situations
involving more than one contractor.
Facilitation does have disadvantages. It is limited
to disputes which do not involve highly polarized positions
or intense animosity. Since the procedure requires the
parties to negotiate the issues without substantive opinions
from the facilitator, a certain amount of trust and working
relationship is required for facilitation to be effective.
[45:74] As a note, if facilitation does not work, it is
simple to transform the process into mediation, which can
provide more assistance in resolving unproductive conflicts
and exploring alternatives than facilitation.
Facilitation is also not appropriate if the parties
feel they need substantive help or a third party to actively
resolve conflict. For instance, when parties have entrenched
positions on highly technical issues, the dispute would be
handled more effectively by another ADR process.
3. Mediation
Mediation is the use of a third party neutral to
assist in settling a dispute which the parties are unable to
negotiate alone. The third party neutral has no decision
making authority. Instead, he/she works to help the parties
negotiate a settlement which is acceptable to all sides.
[45:76]
The use of mediation has been around for 4000 years.
Written Sumerian codes called for a 'mashkim 1 to mediate a
claim initially. If the mashkim failed, the case went to
adjudication. [35] In this country, mediation has been used
extensively in collective bargaining and labor disputes for
decades. It has expanded into many areas recently, including
family disputes, environmental disputes and budget disputes.
[34:255] Several Federal courts of appeal and many district
courts have established mandatory mediation for certain
specified types of cases. [42:30]
Mediation provides assistance with the procedural
elements of settling a dispute. The mediator helps the
parties reach a goal using a variety of techniques.
Initially, the mediator can provide neutral suggestions for
an acceptable process, and keep the process on track. This
is basically the facilitating part of mediation. On a deeper
level, the mediator is an impartial and confidential ear for
the parties, who can identify flaws in entrenched positions,
identify potential areas for agreement, stimulate the parties
to explore other options, and deflate unreasonable attitudes.
Finally, the mediator can articulate the consequences of not
reaching agreement and assist the parties in overcoming the
final hurdles to a satisfactory agreement. [13:108-109]
The process is flexible, but has some generally
identifiable stages. At any point, the mediator may be
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meeting solely with legal counsel, or a combination of legal
counsel and the clients.
The initial meeting is to lay the groundwork for the
process, and stress that the mediator will be an impartial and
confidential party. During the initial meeting, the mediator
may encourage some information exchange, depending on the
willingness of the parties to begin talking. [8:42]
The next step is to create a bargaining atmosphere
between the parties. This step is an important one in
determining the effectiveness of the overall process. The
mediator must get the parties involved in searching for areas
that are negotiable, and expand these areas gradually to
cover all the issues. Simultaneously, he keeps the parties
from becoming entrenched in rigid positions. [8 : 43
]
At this point, the issues in dispute must be
identified, including the hidden interests. This points up
a major strength of mediation. When the parties address the
underlying issues, the solutions are more likely to lead to
long term satisfaction. This may be contrasted to the short
term satisfaction gained from the limited solutions
adjudicated by the courts. Mediators may have to meet
privately and jointly with both parties, over a period of time
to accomplish a mutually acceptable solution. [8:47]
The mediator continues to explore areas of potential
settlement. He may offer alternatives, provide opinions,
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encourage caucuses, or meet separately and confidentially with
both parties. The mediator keeps information confidential upon
request. The mediator also uses deadlines as another tool to
keep the parties moving towards settlement. [8:51-52]
If the process is a success, the last stage is
closure. At this stage, the parties should have the authority
to settle. This is often a problem within the public sector,
since authority may be disbursed. Settlement agreements must
be recorded and enforced, once they are reached. [8:56-58]
Mediation has a number of advantages and
disadvantages. The skills of a trained mediator can go a long
way toward solving a dispute satisfactorily. In a study done
comparing small claims adjudication with mediated settlements,
claimants and defendants were more satisfied with mediated
settlements. Only 8% of the plaintiffs who lost a court case
thought the process was fair, as opposed to 53.8% who lost
a mediation case and still thought the process was fair.
Additionally, compliance with the verdict was higher for
mediated cases, regardless of whether the verdict was
considered fair or unfair. [11:132-135]
It should be emphasized that mediation is aimed toward
settlement to the satisfaction of the parties. The mediator
does not allow personal bias to enter into the process. The
emphasis is toward acceptable solutions, not towards
compliance with set rules and structures.
Another important characteristic of mediation is the
avoidance of positional bargaining, or give and take based on
set positions. One excellent example given by Fisher and Ury
in "Getting to Yes" involved a husband who wished to build a
modern ranch house with a garage, and a wife who wished to
build a two-story house with a chimney and bay window. Both
were unable to negotiate. Both were clinging to their mind
pictures of the perfect home. At this point an architect was
employed to design their house and mediate. His solution was
to find out their interests. For example, why did the husband
want a garage? What design would suit his needs instead of
a garage? By drawing out the reasons for the positions, he was
able to design a house which met both sets of interests, and
avoided the positional stalemate.
Mediation allows the parties to have the benefits of
negotiations by assisting the negotiations process. These
benefits were listed above as:
1. Parties control the process.
2. Interests, not just issues are resolved.
3. More confidential than the courts.
4. Higher satisfaction rate.
5. Higher compliance rate.
Mediation is more effective in establishing and
maintaining a dialogue in cases where the parties are unable
to negotiate unassisted. Mediation also helps smooth out
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hostilities during the process, leading to friendlier long-
term relationships.
The disadvantages to mediation include many of the
negotiation disadvantages. It is not mandatory, therefore
the parties must be willing to negotiate in good faith. It
is not a guaranteed settlement, which means it could simply
lengthen the dispute process. Mediation also has the
potential for providing a poor outcome, though the mediator
can act as a balance to unequal power positions at the
negotiating table. Mediation is also unsuitable for any cases
needing precedent or uniform decisions.
A potential weakness of mediation is the length of
time it may take. Unless the parties have set a deadline, and
are actively committed to the deadline, the procedure may take
months. Integrative solutions are more satisfactory than
adjudicatory ones, but they may take time to develop,
especially if the parties are more used to adversarial
dealings.
4. Mini-Trials
The mini-trial is a process which involves negotiation
and factfinding methods. Essentially, it is a non-binding
hearing, attended by representatives of both parties, who have
settlement authority. Information is exchanged, and the
parties attempt settlement, usually with but sometimes without
a third party advisor.
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The process was created in the late 1970' s, as a
result of a patent infringement suit between Telecredit and
TRW. [43:1] Since then, a number of large companies have used
the procedure, including AT&T, Borden, Shell Oil, Texaco,
Union Carbide and Xerox. It is the most popular ADR method
among corporations in a study done by the Center For Public
Resources. [58:8]
In 1982, NASA pioneered the use of a mini-trial in the
Federal Government using a rather spectacular case. In the
late 70 's, NASA had issued letters of direction on a fixed
price contract involving a tracking and data relay satellite
system. The contractor was Spacecom, a joint venture of two
larger corporations.
Six items came under dispute, including the need for
continuous communication support, and accounting for known
errors in location data from NASA, and software and computer
capability. The claim involved extremely complex, technical
considerations. The case had been tied up in extensive
discovery and pretrial preparation for several years, when
TRW, a major subcontractor to Spacecom, recommended the use
of a mini-trial. NASA agreed and the process was started.
The mini-trial was held and the case was settled in a few days
to the satisfaction of both parties, saving an estimated $1
million in legal fees. [30:16]
53
In 1983, the Department of Justice initiated a mini-
trial pilot program for government contract disputes. [26: 590]
The Corps of Engineers picked up the procedure in 1984, and
has used it successfully in numerous mini-trials. The second
mini-trial held by the Corps was a $55.6 million claim on a
waterway construction. The claim was resolved in two sessions
for $17.2 million. However, the interesting aspect of the
case was the 'hotline' inquiry on the settlement which kicked
off an IG investigation. The IG found the settlement to be
appropriate, even laudable, but was concerned that the
documentation concerning the basis for settlement was
inadequate. The IG recommended the Corps rework its
documenting procedures for pre-negotiation and contract
settlement. [46:3]
The next DoD agency to use the mini-trial was the
Department of the Navy. Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman,
approved a screening of all Navy claims for ADR procedures in
1986. Since then the Navy has settled two claims with mini-
trials, narrowed the issues with another mini-trial without
settling and initiated two more which were settled before the
hearing was held. [26]
Mini-trial is a misnomer. The process is not a trial.
It is instead a "structured form of negotiation". [58:1]
Senior management hears information on the essential elements
of the dispute in a short period of time. The process is
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designed to encourage exchanges which will lead to settlement.
Some mini-trials involve third party neutrals, while others
do not.
The following are the normal elements of a mini-trial.
It should be noted that the procedure is characterized by
flexibility. Both parties may agree to omit or restructure
some of the characteristics.
The procedure is divided into stages. The pre-
negotiation stage allows the parties to agree on the process
details and prepare their positions. The conference presents
the evidence and information exchange. Finally the
negotiation sessions begin which hopefully lead to settlement.
Either party can terminate at any point, and resume
litigation. [58:16]
Most mini-trials begin with the consent of all
parties. It is predominantly a voluntary procedure, although
courts in Michigan and Massachusetts have begun ordering a
mini-trial procedure. [43 : 7 ] Within DoD, it is strictly a
voluntary process.
The parties in dispute enter into an agreement. The
agreement spells out the specific process, including the
identity and roles of participants, time limits, length of
discovery, schedule, and procedures. Agreements allow the
parties to decide how they will run their procedure, but also
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take too long to train the advisor. [30:17] Usually, use of
a neutral is advisable, to help the negotiators over stumbling
blocks, clarify strengths and weaknesses, and provide a
communication link between parties if hostilities erupt. When
a neutral advisor is used, the parties should clarify his
precise role. [58:12]
The schedule is one of the most important parts of the
agreement. Both sides should limit the hearing to a few days
at most. Parties can condense the schedule by limiting
discovery, limiting or deleting witness cross-examination,
condensing presentations, rebuttals and closing arguments, and
finally limiting the negotiating time. If there is an honest
desire to settle, most claimants stick to the schedule. [58:14]
Finally, the agreement should settle the question of
confidentiality. If the mini-trial is terminated, the parties
will go to trial or in front of a BCA. Both sides would be
understandably reluctant to have their negotiations presented
in court. For that reason, most mini-trial agreements specify
that the neutral cannot be brought to court to testify, and




The conference or hearing is the forum for information
exchange. Typically, the schedule involves opening statements,
presentation and rebuttal/questions for both parties, closing
arguments, an open question period, and possibly an opinion
from the neutral advisor. During the conference, both sides
are usually represented by legal counsel. [58:14]
The final stage is the negotiation between the senior
representatives. Legal counsel and staff are not ordinarily
present, but may be consulted in another room as needed. The
neutral advisor may be present, if the agreement specified his
presence. Most mini-trials result in an agreement at this
point. [58:15]
Government mini-trials must be documented. The
agreement, basis for settlement and positions have to be
clearly spelled out in writing, because of the potential for
audits and investigations. Equally important is the need to
justify the expenditure of additional Government funds.
[43:21]
Mini-trials have a number of advantages and
disadvantages. Speed is the first advantage listed for the
mini-trial. Specifically, this means that the mini-trial is
much faster than comparable court time. The mini-trial is
often used to settle large complex claims in a fraction of the
time used for litigation. The conference and negotiations
last only 1-3 days on average, and the period of discovery is
approximately 90 days or less. This feature alone makes the
mini-trial an attractive alternative. [43:47]
The next advantage is the cost savings associated with
the process. The ABA polled nineteen lawyers on mini-trials.
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Their findings indicated that mini-trials cost only 10-15% of
the estimated cost of full-blown litigation. Some estimated
they saved between $300,000 and $400,000. These cost savings
come from several sources. First, a shorter dispute costs
less. Next, companies may use in-house expertise during the
trial versus hiring additional legal expertise. [43 : 47]
Finally, within DoD the Government can save money by
shortening the period, and therefore the amount of interest
due on the claim, should the contractor receive all or part
of the award. The defense contractor may save by shortening
the amount of time he has to perform the contract, since under
the disputes clause he must continue performance and is
accruing cost he may or may not recover.
A third major advantage is the flexibility of the
process. The courts and boards are governed by rigid formal
processes. Although the mini-trial is also governed by firm
rules and procedures in most cases, the difference is the
parties set the rules themselves. Both parties may settle
their dispute in a setting and process that they chose.
In addition to choosing the process, the mini-trial
allows management to participate and control the settlement,
instead of leaving it to lawyers. Control is most important.
The settlement authorities control the process and the
outcome, which is much more satisfactory than relinquishing
the decision to a third party. [50:Section VIII]
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The process lends itself to discussions and
resolutions of the actual issues at stake. Litigation often
degenerates into legal battles that do not get to the heart
of the matter. Mini-trials focus on the real technical and
business matters. The resulting settlements are normally
acceptable to both parties, and have addressed the underlying
problems. [11:272] Consequently, mini-trial settlements tend
to generate solutions which hold up over time without costly
re-litigation.
The Government is ruled largely by bureaucracy. Any
ADR decision, especially those involving large sums is subject
to criticism, audits and investigations. However, an
advantage of the mini-trial is the formality of the procedure,
once an agreement is reached. This formality is likely to
make the mini-trial appear respectable to those questioning
settlements outside of the courts or boards. [50: Section VIII]
The mini-trial is attractive to some because it
lessens hostility. The relationship between the Government
and defense contractors is often adversarial. Long court
battles and the requirement for the contractor to continue
working after a claim is filed tends to fuel the antagonism.
The mini-trial process is much less adversarial. This is
critical in many long-term contract relationships, especially
with the large defense contractors on major weapons.
[50:Section VIII]
59
Finally, the process is voluntary. Normally, both
sides want to be there, and are honestly committed to finding
a solution that is satisfactory to all parties.
The process also has a number of disadvantages.
First, as with many forms of ADR, it is difficult to convince
the other side to use a mini-trial. Most lawyers are not
familiar with the process and believe the other side may have
an advantage. Some parties may also believe they have a clear
case and there is no room for negotiation. [43:33]
The process is still time-consuming, although clearly
not as much as a court battle. It becomes more difficult for
agencies or companies that have never used the process, since
they must learn from scratch. Since the mini-trial involves
fairly extensive preparation, and several days of executive
time, it is not well suited to small claims, (under $100,000) .
However, it is noted that lawyers who have used the mini-trial
generally believe that smaller claims could be solved with
a mini-trial if both parties are committed to settlement.
[43:48]
The confidentiality of a neutral advisor's opinions
and documents used during the trial is not fully resolved.
Settlement discussions are not subject to discovery in a
subsequent trial, if the mini-trial process breaks down.
However, a third party may compel disclosure for other
litigation. For example, in Grumman Aerospace Corp v.
Titanium Metals Corp.
. the court allowed fact-finders to be
subpoenaed for an unrelated dispute. The confidentiality of
the mini-trial is reasonably safe for the actual dispute.
However, the records and opinions of the neutral advisor may
not be confidential on other disputes. [43:36]
Witness credibility is not tested well during a mini-
trial. Since there are no rigid rules of evidence, and
questioning is informal and limited, cases involving factual
issues in concert with credibility issues are inappropriate
for mini-trials. [11:276]
One risk a party takes is the other side is using the
mini-trial to drag out the dispute or to simply test the case
of the other side prior to appearing in court. The process
is voluntary, so the dispute could end up in court if one
party is not participating in good faith.
Finally, the mini-trial may not save significant time
or money if the case has progressed too far in discovery. The
earlier the mini-trial is started, once issues are clarified,
the greater the savings for the Government. [11:275]
5. Dispute Resolution Panels
The dispute resolution panel (or board) is a voluntary
process that uses a panel of independent technical experts,
retained to review disputes and make a non-binding
recommendation to the parties on its resolution.
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The dispute review panel has been used by certain
states in the past for large construction projects. It was
first used within the Federal Government by the US Army Corps
of Engineers. [47:25] • The Corps was searching for an
alternative to mini-trials because of the resistance in the
field to the procedure. One of the alternatives was to use
technical experts to advise the parties. It was felt that in
certain cases, this procedure would be more efficient and more
palatable to the technicians in the Corps.
The process is initially set up to handle problems at
a very early stage. The parties must agree in advance that
certain types of disputes will be handled by the panel.
Following this agreement, the details of funding are
addressed, like panel salaries and travel expenses. Next, the
panel members are chosen. Within the Corps of Engineers, the
contractor and the Corps officials each choose one expert, who
in turn select the third panelist. [40:39] The parties
choose the first two from names submitted by the other party,
and the third name is chosen from a list of names generated
by the Government of well known experts in the field. The
names are chosen based on technical, not legal expertise.
Panel members cannot have been employed by either party for
two years prior to the contract, and cannot have a financial
interest in the contract. [57]
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The following is the procedure used by the Corps of
Engineers. It should be noted that the general process may
be easily tailored to specific agency needs.
Once a dispute arises, and the contracting officer has
rendered an initial opinion, the contractor may submit it for
a COFD or alternately give it to the dispute panel for an
opinion. The contractor must submit it to the panel within
30 days. If the contractor chooses the panel, a hearing is
held. Both sides present the facts of the matter to the
panel, who then has up to 3 days to provide an opinion. Both
parties then have 3 days to accept or reject the decision.
[42:35] As with any dispute, the claim must be made within
the requirements of applicable statutes. For example, the
contractor must certify the claim is accurate and complete for
all claims over $50,000.
Members of the panel need to keep current on the
panel's contract. One method is to visit the site quarterly,
and get briefed on the latest status. The panel members can
also meet regularly with the Government and contractors. [57]
The Corps model may be modified. For instance, the
number of experts could change, or the review period could be
shortened or extended. The contractor and the Government
could decide to automatically submit certain claims to the
panel, or could have additional review. It is even feasible
to have legal as well as technical expertise represented on
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the panel, although the Corps uses the panel only for
technical matters.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the procedure is
that it allows disputes to be handled almost immediately,
before hostilities arise and positions are solidified. [40:39]
Early handling of disputes is recommended by almost every ADR
expert, whenever possible, since it costs less in legally
related expenses, and lessens tensions.
A second benefit is the ease of access for the
parties. The panel is hired by the parties, and is in place,
so scheduling problems are less of a problem. The procedures
are also in place, which saves negotiations on the process
details. Both contribute to less disruption and better
working relationships. [40:39]
The process consumes less time than many methods. It
also is clearly allowable within statutory limits, since it
is purely advisory and limited, (in the case of the Corps of
Engineers) to factual matters. [42:36]
Finally, the process uses respected neutral advisors,
hand picked by the parties for their expertise and other
attributes considered important to the respective disputants.
They are also current on the technical details and history of
the specific contract. Therefore, their opinion is highly
credible. Parties would be likely to listen to the panel's
opinion over other experts. [45:87]
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However, the procedure is currently limited to factual
matters, although the potential does exist for legal matters
as well. This is not a disadvantage, merely a limit on the
effectiveness of the procedure over other possible procedures.
A perceived disadvantage is that the contractor may
be more inclined to dispute because a forum is easily and
readily available. However, there is no empirical evidence
for this, since the process is very new. It is merely a
consideration at this point. [42:36]
Another disadvantage is the potential cost of keeping
the panel current. The process is clearly geared to large
contracts, with a history of conflict. For example, the
construction industry commonly disputes site conditions, so
large construction contracts historically have a history of
conflict. It would be impractical to retain this sort of
expertise for small single contracts. [42:36]
Finally, the procedure does not allow for the parties
to discuss underlying problems. Therefore, it is an
inappropriate method to use for cases requiring integrated
solutions.
6. Advisory Mediation
Advisory mediation is an interesting hybrid involving
mediation and arbitration. The process is non-binding. It
involves using a mediator to resolve the dispute. If the
parties cannot reach settlement, the mediator renders an
65
advisory opinion on how she feels the dispute would be
resolved in front of an arbitrator. [11:256]
This process is very new. It was developed by Stephen
Goldberg in 1980, to assist the labor grievance process in the
coal industry. Goldberg had been a labor arbitrator for 5
years, and was surprised at the number of unnecessary cases
brought to arbitration. He began looking for a better system.
He initially drew from the work of Robben Fleming, who had
matched student arbitration decisions with his own experienced
decisions, and found a high percentage of correlation between
the two. Goldberg felt if inexperienced arbitrators could
make a match, then experienced arbitrators could definitely
predict a match in many cases. He therefore proposed adding
an immediate, oral advisory opinion to the grievance process,
before it formally went to arbitration. [3:137]
Goldberg envisioned using the advisory arbitrator as
a mediator before the final opinion was given. As his idea
matured, he began to place more emphasis on the mediation
portion of the procedure. The increased emphasis was based
on advice from other ADR experts, and on studies showing
mediation was highly successful in mediating grievances. (Some
agencies showed as high as 88% success.) Ultimately, the
procedure required the advisory opinion be given only if the
mediation attempts failed. [3:140]
The procedure was piloted in the coal industry in
June, 1980. [3:141] Acceptance was slow. Unions and
companies had to be coaxed and convinced into giving the new
procedure a try. [3:144] This is a highly relevant point for
any new ADR technique. People are comfortable with a tried
and true procedure, even if they do not like it. To get
acceptance, the procedure must be sold, the process must have
a framework, and it must show advantages over the alternative.
Once it was piloted, advisory mediation was a success.
A staggering 89% of the 153 initial cases were settled by
mediation. Union officials who tried it, were polled. They
stated a 7 to 1 preference for advisory mediation over the
traditional grievance procedure. Another benefit was the new
process was faster. It took an average of 15 days compared
to the 109 day average for arbitration. Finally, an appraisal
of the process after 6 years showed that the approach to
grievances in the coal industry had begun to change. The
approach had gone from almost automatic arbitration of any
grievance, to a problem solving approach between the unions
and management which emphasized integrative solutions early
in the dispute. [3:157-159]
This hybrid process has potential in the contract
dispute arena. The parties in dispute could mediate until
they reach an impasse. At that point, the mediator gives an
impartial oral opinion on the outcome of the case if the
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parties choose to go to the ASBCA or the courts. This opinion
can be used for further negotiations or can be rejected and
the formal CDA procedures used. An opinion should only be
given when the parties have stopped negotiating. Obviously,
once an opinion is rendered, the suspense is gone, and the
mediator loses some of his procedural authority and a lot of
his impartial standing. For that reason, the initial
agreement between the parties should clearly specify the
mediator will be used for procedural assistance only, unless
he needs to give a substantive opinion at the very end.
[45:86]
Although mainly tested in the labor arena, the success
of advisory mediation lies with its ability to provide the
parties with many of the benefits of mediation, including
process control, outcome control, intergrative solutions and
the lessening of hostility. It also allows the parties the
ability to forecast the future results of more binding forums
like the courts. Overall, the average match between the actual
outcome and the advisory opinion is 80% in the labor
grievance field. Although there is no empirical evidence the
match would be as high with contract disputes, the initial
results are high enough to lend credibility to the process.
[45:86]
Another benefit to the procedure is the potential for
savings in legal costs and time. Once again the empirical
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evidence is limited to the labor field. Small claims courts
which use mediation, then non-binding arbitration to solve
small claims have reported lower costs and less time as well,
but the savings depend heavily on volunteer mediators and
arbitrators. [44:2]
The process has certain drawbacks. Advisory mediation
should not be used in cases requiring precedent, or in cases
which must develop public standards. Like mediation, advisory
mediation seeks settlement based on agreement. This makes it
susceptible to compromises which may not hold up to agency or
Federal requirements.
Specific disadvantages to the process revolve around
the advisor. First, the mediator may provide an erroneous
advisory opinion which is accepted by the parties. [11:260]
Contracting officials would have to be ready to factor that
risk into any decisions. Secondly, the advisory opinion may
strengthen the resolve of the 'winner' to cease negotiations,
and proceed to the BCA or court. [11:258] However, the
process shows promise, possibly in the small claims area,
since it was originally devised to solve small grievances.
7. Fact-finding
Fact-finding is an impartial decision on some or all
of the facts in the case from a neutral advisor. The fact-
finder often researches the facts, and may come up with data
unknown to any of the parties. In almost all circumstances,
69
the fact-finder is a recognized expert on the subject being
disputed. [18:5]
This is a very simple method. Many Government
contract disputes are very factual. [40: 33] The contracting
officer and the contractor may get locked into a disagreement
on the facts, including the impact of environmental factors
on a dispute, the technical interpretation of a contract
specification or the amount of an entitlement.
The essence of fact-finding is to receive a report
from an expert neutral who is acceptable to both parties to
get a new perspective on entrenched positions. The actual
process may entail the use of several experts. The process
may involve formal hearings in front of the experts, or the
hiring of a neutral to do independent research on the issue
using interviews, general technical knowledge, industry
standards and available documentation. [45:87]
The parties should decide precisely what they want in
the report. The options include:
1. Presentation of all relevant data without a
specific recommendation on settlement.
2. Presentation of all relevant data with a
recommendation either on the process to use to
settle, or specific recommendations for
settlement. [45:87]
Usually fact-finding is used in conjunction with a
negotiation process, although it is possible the parties may
settle using a fact-finder's recommendation.
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Fact-finding has advantages and disadvantages.
Perhaps the chief advantage of fact-finding is that it allows
the parties to use an independent person to assess the
conflicting viewpoints of a number of experts. This person
is familiar with the language and values and general practices
of the technical community he represents. Therefore, he can
interpret the data and make a recommendation or a report based
on more than just testimony.
Fact-finding also allows the representatives of the
party to take a clearer look at their positions. This can
help break a deadlock.
There are some disadvantages as well. As with any
substantive assistance, the neutral may offer an opinion which
is accepted by the parties, but later proves to be erroneous.
This is a calculated risk taken by the disputants.
This form of dispute resolution is by its nature
limited to factual situations. However it is often used in
conjunction with other dispute resolution methods, such as
negotiation.
The success of fact-finding hinges partially on
whether the parties can find a neutral who is acceptable to
everyone. This may be difficult in some situations.
8. Settlement Conferences
The settlement conference is an ADR technique which
uses a judge as a third party advisor and mediator during pre-
trial negotiations. The judge used is not the trial judge,
although outside DoD, many settlements are mediated by the
trial judge. Although the settlement conference may be an
issue raised in a pre-trial conference, it is not a pre-trial
conference. It is instead, a non-binding procedure which




The modern settlement conference originated in
Scandinavian countries, as an effort to solve disputes using
local norms. The procedure migrated to the United States
early in this century. Courts attempted to reach pre-trial
settlement using community values as a base. Gradually, the
process became oriented towards helping clear congested court
dockets. [33:490]
In 193 8, the Government adopted Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. [33:491] Rule 16 sets out the
procedure for the pre-trial conference, which is a conference
to handle administrative details before the trial, including
case review, number of expert witnesses, discovery orders and
issue specification. [1:179] The rule does not specify
settlement as a point of discussion, yet subsection 6 calls
for consideration of "such other matters as may aid in the
disposition of the action". This is interpreted by many as
the authority to attempt settlement. [1:180] Since 1938, the
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use of the settlement conference has grown, and has even been
made mandatory in some state courts. {36:493]
Inside the Government disputes process, the Claims
Court has adopted a General Order which allows the voluntary
use of a settlement judge. If the parties decide to use the
judge, he will hear a shortened presentation of the case, and
generate discussion between the parties. The judge may also
give an advisory opinion on the strengths and weaknesses of
the case. This opinion carries some weight, since it is
essentially legal advice. This advice allows the parties to
judge how their case might actually fare in court. [18:5]
The use of a settlement conference may be initiated
by either party. However, it is usually recommended by the
judge during a pre-trial conference after negotiations have
failed. If both parties agree, it is scheduled. The lawyers,
with or without their respective clients, will negotiate with
a judge's assistance. The parties can cease negotiations at
any time and take the issue to litigation without
repercussion. [1:178]
Many lawyers believe that certain types of judicial
involvement in settlement discussions improves the chances for
settlement. In a 1984 study, 85% of the lawyers polled
believed that judges helped settlement when they actively
analyzed the case and provided opinions or suggestions based
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on the analysis. They did not believe that judges who used
standard compromise formulas helped settlement. [33:499]
The settlement conference has advantages and
disadvantages. First, like any negotiated or mediated
settlement, the parties have some control of the outcome,
which usually leads to greater acceptance of the final
agreement. [33:502]
Settlement conferences assist the parties in 'reality
testing' their case. Lawyers can use this device if their
clients are being stubborn on a weak position, and managers
can use it as a means of testing the legal advice they are
receiving. [45:89]
The process allows the parties to gain many of the
benefits of mediation, including a neutral to help break an
impasse and a forum which allows better relationships in the
future than the courts. [45:78]
The process helps the parties to avoid the legal costs
of a trial. However, it should be noted that legal fees and
costs become greater over time, and the settlement conference
is usually held as a last resort to litigation. Therefore,
the savings are not as great as they would be if the dispute
had been handled by another ADR process at an earlier time.
The value and risks of a negotiated settlement should be
carefully weighed against those of a litigation settlement
before a decision is made to settle. [45:90]
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The parties may be able to save time. This would be
desirable only if the trial is expected to take a long time.
The settlement conference does have certain
disadvantages as well. It is not applicable to those cases
where mediation is inappropriate, including those which
require precedent or those cases where there are no issues to
negotiate. It is not as appropriate for cases which hinge on
highly technical rather than legal issues, simply because the
normal judge's expertise lies in the law, not specialized
technical fields.
Care must be taken to avoid settling cases by the
'Lloyds of London 1 formula, where the judge asks the parties
to split the difference within a reasonable range, or some
other predetermined formula. This type of settlement can im-
prove the efficiency of the process at the sacrifice of the
quality. [33:508] Generally, the parties should be careful
of being pressured into acceptance of a settlement simply
because it is so close to a trial. Instead, the settlement
should be analyzed carefully on its merits, before acceptance,
rejection, or as a basis for further negotiations.
9. Non-Binding Arbitration
Arbitration is an adjudication process which has more
informal characteristics than judicial proceedings. It is
defined as:
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A process by which parties voluntarily refer their
disputes to an impartial third person, an arbitrator,
selected by them for a decision based on the evidence and
arguments to be presented before the arbitration tribunal.
The parties agree in advance that the arbitrator's
determination, the award, will be accepted as final and
binding upon them." [20:70]
Non-binding arbitration is basically the same, except the
decision is not final.
Arbitration became respectable in World War II. The
Government could not afford labor strikes or lockouts that
would interfere with the war effort. To prevent work
stoppages, Congress mandated that industry use either the
option of voluntary arbitration by mutual agreement or
mandatory arbitration by a War Labor Board. The procedure
gradually became an integral part of labor relations
proceedings. [2:15-16]
While labor arbitration became prominent quickly in
the flames of a world war, commercial arbitration has evolved
more slowly for industry. Some industries began using
arbitration because of their special nature. The New York
Stock Exchange could not afford prolonged court battles
because of their volume. They institutionalized arbitration.
The textile industry began using arbitration because of their
dependence on repetitive sales and customer goodwill. [2 : 28]
Over the years, other industries have followed suit, realizing
arbitration was less expensive, and less damaging to business
relationships.
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The arbitration process involves a hearing in front
of an impartial expert. During the process, the arbitrator
hears the dispute and reviews all the evidence from the two
parties. The format of the evidence, the proceedings and
hearings and the final decision are governed by flexible
rules. Arbitration proceedings may be formal or very
informal, depending on the wishes of the arbitrating parties.
Arbitration is performed by one or more arbitrators,
usually selected by the parties. Qualified arbitrators are
available through industry volunteers or selected from rosters
compiled by various organizations. The American Arbitration
Association (AAA) , is one such organization. They carry over
60,000 neutral advisors on their roles. As a point of
interest, some commercial arbitrators traditionally do not
accept fees unless the case is extremely complex or long.
The normal selection process gives both parties the
choice of their adjudicator. Arbitrators are chosen based on
their neutrality, technical and industry knowledge, and any
other attributes required by the specific situation. In some
proceedings, arbitration is done by a panel. Each party will
choose an arbitrator, who will in turn select a third
arbitrator known as an umpire. The proceedings are the same
as before, except the hearing is conducted in front of a panel
instead of a single person. [50:2-3]
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Arbitration is conducted under rules set by the
parties. Rules developed by agencies like the AAA are
frequently used by default, or with minor adjustments. These
rules are simple, direct and clear. For example, the AAA's
rules for commercial arbitration, from start to finish, take
18 pages. They cover legal topics such as order of proceeding,
time, place and judicial review, but are written to allow
maximum flexibility for the arbitrator. [39:3]
Once the hearing portion of the process is completed,
the arbitrator renders an advisory opinion, which the parties
may accept or reject. If they reject the decision, they can
use portions of it to conduct negotiations, or take the
dispute to court.
A recent category of arbitration is court annexed
arbitration. The courts will direct that the parties submit
to non-binding arbitration. This gets the parties talking to
each other in a less adversarial atmosphere. If either party
does not like the final decision, the court will require they
improve their claim by a certain percentage or pay additional
court costs. Even when the decision is not accepted, it often
leads to more negotiation and pre-trial agreements. [50:3]
Non-binding arbitration has its advantages and
disadvantages. There are a number of reasons that arbitration
is preferred by business in certain cases. First, it can be
much faster than using the courts. The average dispute is
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settled in 60 to 90 days or less. One large case involving a
$4 million dollar claim was settled in just two days.
[18:48] The arbitration process is faster because the hearing
can occur without scheduling into a court docket, and the
rules may be informal and skip a lot of procedure. [50:21]
Speed is an important point when considering
arbitration for Government contracting. The Commission on
Government Procurement found that two-thirds of small business
would not appeal claims under $5000 partly due to the time.
[27:2]
Since arbitration procedures are flexible, both
parties can avoid time consuming formalities. The potential
informality, and the ability to choose the arbitrator is
attractive in many cases. (It must be noted that even non-
binding arbitration can become a long formal proceeding if one
or both parties do not cooperate.)
Faster, more flexible dispute resolution is less
costly. This is often the bottom line for businesses, and
should be important to the Government. Lengthy litigation has
direct costs, including lawyer fees, judge's time, costs of
preparing evidence and court or board administrative costs.
Courts are by nature adversarial. In the business
world, a bitter court battle may win a short term victory for
one party at the expense of long term relationships.
Government should view disputes as rationally as business.
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Agencies should encourage any method which lessens the tension
between parties, saves taxpayer dollars, encourages
contractors to stay in the industrial base and improves future
working relationships.' Arbitration is one way to settle
certain claims in a way that satisfies both parties.
Another advantage of arbitration is the background of
the arbitrator. The judge in a trial or board must be
educated on the background of the case. The arbitrator does
not need technical background, since he is an expert in his
field. In commercial arbitration, many arbitrators have
decades of experience in the industry. They grasp the nuances
and background of the situation quickly, and are familiar with
the customs and practices of their field. They speak the
language of the industry, while many trial judges do not.
The final advantage to arbitration is the nature of
the award. Court awards may be only legal, not fair or
appropriate in certain instances. An arbitrator, unlike the
courts is not bound by precedent or rigid rules of evidence
or admissability. He has more freedom in his decision.
Therefore he has ability to weigh and decide on both hard fact
and intangibles and can often satisfy both parties.
Arbitration also has its disadvantages. The major
disadvantage is the loss of many legal safeguards. Arbitration
does not contain the checks and balances of the courts and
boards. The claimant who selects arbitration must often weigh
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speed and flexibility against the possibility of an adverse
opinion. This disadvantage limits the type of cases suited
to arbitration.
A second major disadvantage is the lack of uniformity
of awards. The arbitrator makes the decisions based on
his/her background, not established precedent. This creates
an element of uncertainty for parties concerning the outcome
of an arbitrator's opinion, although this is not as critical
in non-binding arbitration.
Non-binding arbitration basically turns the control
of the outcome over to a third party, much the same as in a
court. This means that the parties do not have to work out
their differences. They can simply rely on another to do this
for them. The result is that although arbitration is much
less adversarial than the courts, it does not allow the
parties to develop integrative solutions.
A final area of concern is the increasing formality
of arbitration.
We are a nation addicted to laws. Although many
complain about the complexity of the law, the trend in this
country has been to pass more laws and tighten procedures.
Board proceedings have become increasingly formal and rigid
over the years despite the existence of streamlined hearings.
The boards have become more formal, partly to protect the
rights of individuals because of limited judicial review.
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Arbitration carries the same potential. Even
voluntary arbitration can become formal when the parties are
more comfortable with strict rules of order. There is a
danger that the use of arbitration could become as cumbersome
as the legal proceedings it replaced. [53: Table 4]
10. Summary Binding ASBCA Procedure
The summary ASBCA procedures developed by the Navy to
handle small claims is the only binding ADR procedure which
has been found to be legal within DoD. This is because the
procedure uses ASBCA judges.
The procedure was developed in 1987. The Navy had
begun to experiment with ADR, and had determined that the
mini-trial, although useful, was too costly to handle the
smaller cases which were a large part of the Navy's workload.
The Navy defined the small claims case as being heavily
factual, involving only one or two issues, and of small dollar
value. [54:5] Therefore, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) stated in a memorandum dated 13
July 1987, that Navy contracting officers would afford
contractors the opportunity to take advantage of the ASBCA
summary procedures for disputes under $25,000.
Basically, the procedure is relatively simple. The
parties motion the ASBCA for permission to process their case
under summary procedures. Once the motion is approved, the
parties will present their case to an ASBCA judge. The actual
82
presentation may be flexible. For example, the case may be
presented pro se. The actual time is about one hour. Once
the presentations are made, the judge decides the case from
the bench. The only document is the decision on whether the
appeal is sustained or denied and how much is awarded. The
decision is binding, since parties must agree ahead of time
to waive their right of appeal under the CDA. [47] An
alternate method is to have the judge issue a verbal, binding
decision without preparing a written decision. [42:37]
Participation in the process is voluntary, but
excludes precedential cases. The procedure also allows
resolution of small cases in groups. The procedure is similar
to the existing small claims procedures at the ASBCA, but is
not strictly tied to the dollar limits as are the accelerated
and expedited methods. [42:36]
This method has the potential advantage of saving
court time. However, the procedure has not been
enthusiastically received by industry. No empirical studies
have been done to date on the lack of acceptance but the
procedure is close enough to the accelerated and expedited
procedures under the CDA to allow speculation.
First, industry is reluctant to use binding procedures
without the ability to appeal, especially when dealing with
the Federal Government. This trend is apparent in the lack
of acceptance of binding decisions, and the increasing
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formality of the BCA processes to protect litigants rights.
The incentive to save some court costs is apparently not
balanced by the need for an avenue of appeal, even if the
avenue is limited. Finally, the small claims process does not
allow the litigant to have much control over the procedure.
Rather it passes the control to a third party, perceived to
be 'Government', with few of the safeguards inherent in the
more formal BCA process.
C. UNUSABLE ADR TECHNIQUES
The following techniques are not applicable to DoD
contract disputes for a number of reasons. First, processes
which bind the Government using a third party neutral are
unallowable. These are binding arbitration and its hybrids
such as med-arb, mediation then arbitration and private
judging. Several procedures just simply are not suitable to
DoD contract disputes by their nature. These are the summary
jury trials, regulatory negotiation, neighborhood justice
centers and the ombudsman. Finally, pre-dispute cooperative
or relationship building techniques are important but cannot
be evaluated in this thesis, since there are no criteria if
there is no dispute. Each of these techniques will be
discussed in this chapter.
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1. Binding Arbitration
Binding arbitration is the most common form of
arbitration. It is a voluntary procedure, since a process
that binds cannot be made mandatory by the courts. Both
parties are bound by the final decision of the arbitrator.
This finality is backed by law. The United States Arbitration
Act backs up the process by allowing review only in the
following instances:
1. When there is evidence of fraud, corruption or
undue means.
2. When the arbitrators did not allow evidence which
prejudiced the rights of the defendant or
claimant.
3. When the arbitrators clearly exceeded their powers
or were so incompetent that a final, mutual and
definite award was not made. [50:4]
The process is almost identical to non-binding
arbitration, in theory, except that both parties must abide
by the award. However, the finality of the award can
predispose the parties toward an extremely formal process.
Some critics of binding arbitration fear that its basically
adjudicatory nature could eventually lead to rigid and time-
consuming procedures to protect the interests of the parties.
Binding arbitration is not currently legal within DoD.
The Government cannot be locked into policies made by third




Mediation and arbitration may be combined in a number
of ways to produce a hybrid which combines some of the
features of both. There are two common methods of combining
the processes. The first is med-arb, which is mediation, then
binding arbitration performed by the same person. The second
is mediation then binding arbitration where the parties agree
to mediate first, then arbitrate if the mediation breaks down.
However, different people are used for the mediation and
arbitration.
Med-arb has been used extensively in labor conflicts,
where the participants are of relatively equal experience.
[11:268] This process has been described as 'mediation with
muscle". [11:265] Originators of the idea were looking for
a faster, less formal alternative to the labor arbitration
process. They believed the med-arb process would provide all
the benefits of mediation, with additional clout provided by
the threat of arbitration.
Proponents of med-arb state that it provides many of
the benefits of mediation, notably the satisfaction with the
process which comes with participation. One med-arbitrator
has stated that the process has been used in numerous diverse
fields of labor as well as in commercial disputes. He goes
on to say "Of the literally hundreds of issues involved in
such cases, less than a dozen had to be finally arbitrated by
the med-arbitrator." [11:265-66]
The difference between traditional mediation and med-
arb comes from the threat of arbitration if the mediation
breaks down. Arbitration is more costly, more time-consuming
and much more uncertain than mediation, so parties negotiating
in good faith have more incentive to avoid it. Med-arb may
also prevent superfluous arguing and saber-rattling in front
of a mediator who could become a binding arbitrator tomorrow.
[7:265]
Opponents of med-arb believe that one individual
cannot perform both mediation and arbitration on the same
case. They view the processes as distinctly different. On
the one hand, mediation is geared towards reaching an
agreement that is satisfactory to both parties. This entails
exchanging a lot of information related to values and
interests and hidden issues. Arbitration, on the other hand
is more adjudicatory in nature, with a decision based on facts
and proofs and logical arguments. The information exchange
is slanted very differently. Critics argue that a mediator,
who must then arbitrate would have to 'forget' the material
she has heard that is irrelevant to arbitration, and receive
more information slanted towards arbitration. Worse, parties
may not mediate honestly, for fear that confidential
information may be used against them in an arbitration
decision. [11:248]
Mediation then arbitration, on the other hand, using
separate persons, is not viewed as a contrary process. Some
of the advantages would be the same, such as the ability to
mediate first, and attempt to settle disputes constructively
between parties, and the impetus to settle because of the
threat of immediate arbitration. However, the mediator does
not have the same clout as the med-arbitrator.
Both processes have had positive results in settling
disputes. However, they are binding processes, and as such
are not applicable to DoD contracting disputes.
3. Private Judging
Private judging, also known as rent-a-judge by the
irreverent, is the use of a privately selected and paid
neutral referee who renders a binding decision on a dispute
after a hearing. The procedure differs from arbitration in
that the case is referred to the neutral by a rule of the
court. Once a binding decision is made, the parties can appeal
it on much broader grounds than arbitration. [11:281]
A number of states have adopted the procedure. For
instance, in California, certain cases are permitted to
voluntarily adopt the private judging process. The California
model will be used as an example since it illustrates the
general process.
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Under the law, the court may allow the parties to
voluntarily choose a neutral referee to render a decision on
one fact or all the issues in a case, and anything in-between.
The parties may use a neutral of their choosing or the court
may appoint one if the parties cannot agree. Once selected,
and appointed by the court, the referee has almost all the
powers of a judge. (The exceptions are contempt findings and
the power to appoint referees.) [11:286]
The procedure used is fairly flexible, but may be as
formal as a full trial. However, because of the ability to
appeal, witnesses must be sworn, substantive law and
evidentiary rules must be followed, and the referee is
required to submit a written report to the court on the
findings. [11:287]
Once the referee decides, the parties must abide by
the decision subject to the appeal ability. Referee costs are
shared by the disputants. The process allows a trial without
the wait, and is attractive to corporations for that reason.
Often, the referee is a former judge.
Private judging is a successful tool. However, it
is a binding process and is therefore unsuitable for
Government contracting disputes.
4. Summary Jury Trials
The summary jury trial is basically a mock trial. The
parties in dispute can elect to have their case reviewed by
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a jury in an abbreviated trial. The non-binding verdict
rendered by the jury may then be used in further settlement
negotiations. [11:282]
The process was developed by Judge Thomas Lambros in
the last decade. His reasoning was to encourage settlement
and reduce the burden on the legal system while retaining the
tradition of the jury. [32:52] Several studies since the
introduction of the summary jury trial have resulted in
tentative findings that it is useful in reaching full
settlement before trial. Notably, of 80 cases taken to
summary jury, 40% settled before the summary jury trial, and
only three went to a full trial. [11:283]
Summary jury trials are intended for difficult cases,
where negotiations have degenerated into glares across the
table. If the judge believes he can break the deadlock by
exposing the parties to the impartial and stressful spotlight
of the courtroom, he may recommend the procedure. Quite
often, the disputing parties will settle, once they see how
their case appears in court. [32:52]
Courts may adopt the procedure under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16, which allows extrajudicial procedures to
be used in attempts to settle. The basic procedure, once
approved, is as follows. The judge rules on the aspects of
the trial during the pre-trial conference as she would for a
real trial. Counsels submit jury instructions, exhibit lists
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and other items three days before the trial. Often a
conference is held just before the trial in order to encourage
settlement one more time. [32:53]
A jury of six is chosen and the court is convened.
The judge briefly explains the process and the case. The
jurors are challenged and the final jury chosen. Next, after
a five minute overview, the sides have one hour to present
their cases, with relaxed rules of evidence. Complex cases
usually have more time. Witness testimony is limited to sworn
statements. Cross-examination, rebuttal and surrebuttal are
limited. The judge then explains the points of law to the
jury, the jury deliberates and the verdict is returned. Once
the jury has given their verdict, they are asked to comment
on the presentations. The entire process takes one day.
Although the process shows promise for cases decided
by jury, it is not applicable to Government contract disputes
because the forums for these disputes do not involve jury
trials. If Government officials wish to get an opinion of how
they would fare in court, or in front of the board, they could
use other ADR procedures which entail the advisory opinion of
a judge.
5 . Ombudsman
An ombudsman is defined as "...a third party who
receives and investigates complaints or grievances aimed at
an institution by its constituents, clients or employees."
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[53:46] The classic ombudsman is appointed by the Government.
Industry also makes use of the ombudsman. Finally, the media
has instituted a variation on the ombudsman in the form of
action lines or hotlines, where a complaint is heard by an
expert and followed up with the business or agency. [53 : 46]
The ombudsman institution began in Sweden in 1809,
under the new Swedish Constitution, as an office to parallel
the Chancellor of Justice who worked for the King of Sweden.
This new official was to be the watchman of the officials.
He reported to the Parliament. [10:194]
The 'classic' model as developed by the Swedes
involved the appointment of an official to investigate
complaints against the Government, and make recommendations
concerning the complaint. The ombudsman is an appointee, for
a fixed term. He is impartial, independent and has expertise
in Government. Many countries prefer a lawyer as an
appointee. [16:1]
The ombudsman in the Swedish model has limited powers,
once a complaint is investigated. He cannot give orders,
reverse a decision or reopen a case he thinks was handled
incorrectly. However, he can discipline an official for
incorrect actions due to carelessness, imprudence or
ignorance. The discipline may run from prosecution which is
rarely used, to a formal rebuke which is by far the most
frequent sanction used. [10:205]
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The prosecution powers given to the ombudsman in
Sweden are not universal. Finnish, Soviet and Polish
ombudsman may prosecute incompetent or negligent officials.
In Denmark, the ombudsman can only recommend prosecution.
In other countries such as Japan and the United States (state
government only) , the ombudsman may only use persuasion.
The process was adopted in the United States in Hawaii
in 1967. From there it spread to other states. [16: 2 ] One was
Nebraska, which characteristically endowed its ombudsman with
investigation and recommendation powers only. The ombudsman
uses his office to investigate complaints, and attempts to
resolve them by working through the various agencies. [16:8]
This process could potentially lend itself to use by
an agency in hearing, investigating and potentially mediating
contract claims in the early stages. However, as it currently
exists, the process is not geared to resolution of contract
disputes, and for that reason will not be analyzed further.
6. Regulatory Negotiation
Regulatory negotiation is an ADR method used to
establish regulations in a cooperative manner by bringing
together the agency and the various interest groups to discuss
the controversial portions of new regulations. The goal is to
negotiate a regulation that will be acceptable from its
conception, instead of extensive challenges in the courts.
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It is not applicable to the field of contract disputes.
[29:32]
7. Neighborhood Justice Centers
Neighborhood justice centers are local dispute
resolution centers which handle grievances from the local
community. The centers employ several ADR techniques, notably
mediation, conciliation or med-arb. Cases are primarily
landlord-tenant, domestic and neighbor conflicts. The
procedure is not applicable to resolving contract disputes.
8. Cooperative Decision Making
The simplest way to resolve a dispute is to prevent
it from happening. This is not technically a dispute
resolution process, since many of the techniques are used
before conflicts arise. The goal is to build a cooperative




This area of dispute resolution cannot be ignored.
Although it will not be evaluated, since a dispute that has
not occurred has no criteria, the literature is clear that
cordial relationships lead to simpler resolutions once
problems arise. Several examples of cooperative problem
solving are listed below.
The South Atlantic Division of the Corps of Engineers
hosted a round table discussion on ADR with major companies
and law firms who do business with them. The purpose of the
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meeting was to promote ADR and allow discussion on the merits
and obstacles to using various ADR techniques. Two major
points of emphasis in a discussion on obstacles included open
communication and early action. Participants felt that,
"Communication before disputes arise helps head off problems
and dispel bad feelings and false perceptions." They went on
to say that scheduled communications were important during the
project. [56:7]
The participants also felt early resolution was the
most effective form of resolution. They felt that as a
dispute dragged on, legal expenses grew and positions became
entrenched. [56:7]
Early information exchange could be done in a number
of ways. The Corps uses a very new technique called
'partnering'. Partnering is done at a conference after
contract award but before contract performance. During the
conference, the parties discuss how they will handle different
types of potential disputes if they occur. The conference is
also used to build a feeling of teamwork, establish trust and
promote understanding. [65] As stated before, cooperative




This chapter discusses the various ADR methods in use
today. Certain methods are listed as suitable for analysis
in resolving DoD contract disputes. These methods are non-
binding arbitration, mediation, negotiation, factfinding,
mini-trials, settlement judges, dispute resolution boards,
advisory mediation, and the ASBCA small claims procedures.
Other procedures are discussed, but have been found to be
inappropriate because they illegally bind the Government using
a third party neutral, are not processes which can be
effectively used in the area of Government contract disputes
or occur before an actual dispute arises.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND GUIDE PRESENTATION
A. STEPS IN DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter will analyze available data on the
differences between ADR methods and the criteria required to
choose an appropriate method. The steps in analysis are as
follows:
1. The criteria used in choosing an appropriate
method are listed and described. These criteria
were compiled by an intensive screen of the
current literature on ADR. The first six criteria
presented are ones which do not help in specific
method selection. Instead, they allow the
contracting official to decide whether to use ADR
over more traditional dispute methods. The rest




A matrix was developed which matched the
appropriate criteria with the ADR methods being
analyzed. The first matrix table, (Table 1) ,
lists the criteria as ( + ) or (-) . A positive
match means the method should be selected and a
negative match means the method should not be
selected.
3 The matrix is further refined in a second matrix
table, (Table 2) . This table simplifies the data
presentation and codes the matches as completely
positive (+) , completely negative (-) , a mixture
of positive and negative matches (D) , or no data
recorded (N)
.
4. The six criteria which only show whether to select
ADR at all are listed separately. Positive
matches (+) mean choose ADR, negative (-) matches
mean do not choose ADR.
5. The remaining criteria are broken into three more
tables, (Table 3, 4 and 5). Minor changes were
made to the order of data presentation. Criteria
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are listed from the ones occurring most frequently
by method to those occurring least frequently.
This way the contracting officer can see at a
glance the criteria which affect numerous methods
versus those that affect only a single method.
ADR methods were also reordered. This was done
because some criteria clustered themselves around
certain groups of methods such as the
negotiation/mediation based methods.
The Table 3 is a positive table, designed to
assist the contracting officer in ADR method
selection. Table 4 is a negative table designed
to help the contracting officer delete certain
methods. Table 5 shows the criteria which are
divided into both positive and negative data.
6. Once the tables were established, the separate
methods were analyzed for broad trends to help the
contracting officer mentally group methods
together and give him a greater understanding of
differences and similarities between the separate
choices. This ended the data analysis portion.
B. CASE CRITERIA-DECIDING TO USE ADR OVER TRADITIONAL
METHODS
There are 33 criteria analyzed in this thesis to assist
in choosing an appropriate ADR method. Six of these criteria
apply to choosing between ADR and the traditional dispute
process. ADR is not a substitute for the courts. As stated
before, it is merely a tool to allow the courts to handle
those cases which need judicial intervention, and allow the
contracting officer more flexibility in handling cases that
do not need the courts. The following criteria will help a
contracting official decide whether to use the courts/boards
or attempt an ADR technique.
98
1. Need for Precedent or Public Norm
One of the basic functions of the judiciary is to
interpret the law. Certain cases under dispute are linked to
many other cases which are waiting for a precedent. Other
cases may involve the first test of a law or may be tied to
legal issues that would set a public standard. (The most
common example used is the civil rights case of Brown v. The
Board of Education which helped begin the movement for
equality of all races under the law.) These cases should be
tried in the courts. They are not appropriate for ADR.
2. Willingness to Settle Using ADR
The contractor and the Government must have an honest
desire to settle the case before an ADR techniques may be
used. This case criterion has several dimensions. First, the
Government must be satisfied that the contractor is not
attempting to simply drag out a case. Sometimes the
contractor does not want to go to court and will use any
excuse to lengthen the pre-trial period. Secondly, the
contractor must be willing to use an alternative to the
courts/boards, since all the DoD ADR processes are voluntary,
and all but one are non-binding. Finally, the contracting
official must ensure that his agency is willing to support the
use of ADR.
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3. Claims without Merit
Some claims from contractors have no merit. For
example, a claim which hinges solely on clear legal principles
in favor of the Government, is not appropriate for ADR. The
same is true for claims which border on fraudulent, or are
viewed as just a ploy to get more money from the Government's
'deep pocket'. Contracting officials should make an honest
attempt to differentiate between claims without merit and
claims where they do not agree with the contracting officer.
Legal assistance would be helpful in this determination.
4 . Privacy
More privacy is an advantage in all the ADR techniques
analyzed for use in this thesis. Disputes may be resolved
more efficiently when the parties do not have to worry about
every word being a matter of public record. In the public
sector, agencies may not make decisions on contract disputes
completely off the record. They must, at a minimum, document
the rationale for the decision as well as the decision itself.
However, the ADR techniques in question do not require
minutes like the courts. Therefore, if more privacy is
desirable, ADR should be considered.
5. Lowered Costs
One of the primary reasons for the growing popularity
of ADR is the perception that it lowers costs in relation to
the courts and boards. If lower costs are desirable, all
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other things being equal, contracting officials should examine
the use of ADR.
The Corps of Engineers developed a simple formula to
assess cost risk. The formula is to use ADR when V
T
- V^ <
L + i, where V
T
is the expected value of a traditional
settlement, V^ is the expected value of an ADR settlement,
L is the cost of litigation expenses and i is the cost of
interest. [59:61] Other agencies may wish to use different
methods, but the basic principle is the same. Most of the
literature focuses on the direct cost savings of each ADR
method over the most common traditional method. This is
clearly the simplest method to use based on such things as
standard court costs per day, lawyer hours and administrative
costs including salaries for the length of the trial.
6. Outcome in Court is Considered Risky
In some cases, the Government may have a good case
which is not a guaranteed case. Simultaneously, the case may
risk setting precedent or involve large sums of money. If the
Government does not want to risk the courts, then ADR may be
appropriate.
C. CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING AN ADR METHOD
The following criteria apply to choosing specific ADR
methods. Some of the criteria apply to one specific method,
almost to the exclusion of all others. More commonly, other
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criteria apply to several methods or a group of methods on the
ADR continuum.
1. Complex Issues
Complex issues are those which involve highly
technical matters of fact or law. The issues become even more
complex when they are interrelated. Certain ADR processes
which involve participants who are able to grasp the issues
are better for these types of cases. Negotiation based
procedures are recommended for this. Technical experts in
procedures such as fact-finding are occasionally recommended
when the case is based on facts.
2. Multiple Parties Involved
Multiple party issues involve a number of players,
often with different agendas. In certain claims, this can
include subcontractor issues brought up by the prime. There
are differences of opinion on whether all negotiation type
methods are best for handling multiple parties. Facilitation
is one method that is clearly recommended.
3. Continuing Relationship Between the Parties
The term 'continuing relationships' means a case where
the players are locked into a long term arrangement because
of a lengthy contract. It also applies to defense
contractors who do a high percentage of Government business,
and are constantly working on one or more Government
contracts. Certain ADR processes, especially those where the
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parties work out the situation by assisted or unassisted
negotiation, help the long term relationships. That is
because the parties will deal with each other in procedures
dedicated to developing mutually satisfactory solutions and
building trust, as well as solving the immediate claim issues.
4. Need for Timely Resolution
The need for a fast resolution is important in many
cases, such as those which involve high amounts of interest
from the Government, or when the financial survival of the
firm depends on it. Certain forms of ADR are faster than
other methods by nature. First, if the process is easily
scheduled, the dispute process is initiated quickly. For
example, the small claims procedures must be scheduled based
on the availability of ASBCA judges while the time to use a
neutral fact-finder is limited only by the internal selection
process. Secondly, and more importantly, certain processes
are by their nature faster than others. Mediation is a
process which explores the different facets of the problem,
often with confidential meetings with the parties. It can be
a very time intensive process, although this is not always the
case, especially in small cases with simple issues. A non-
binding arbitration process on the other hand may be
structured by the parties to be extremely time efficient.
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5. Need for Control of the Process
Management is often much more satisfied with processes
which are determined by the parties than with a formal and
inflexible procedure. If the case has a history of
unsatisfactory resolution using formal third party decisions,
(such as the courts) , ADR techniques providing control may be
more suitable. Cases where the parties determine they need
more control simply because of the personalities or previous
experiences are also appropriate.
Flexibility is an attribute which is inherent in
controlling a process. When management controls the process,
to an extent they have some flexibility to make process
changes to break a stalemate or impasse, or to improve
relationships between parties. For example, both parties
agree on the time limits for negotiations during a mini-trial.
However, both parties may allow an extension if they see a
compelling need.
6. Technical Expertise is Needed
Cases often hinge on a dispute between the technical
experts of both parties. Often, the parties disagree in good
faith about the interpretation of a contract clause, the
amount of entitlement for a change or the technical meaning
of an agreed upon task or standard. The expertise needed may
be factually or legally based. In such cases, the
recommendation or report of an expert recognized and respected
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by both parties may break the impasse by showing how a case
appears to someone who has no vested interests.
One major strength of using a skilled neutral is the
ability to choose experts in a very narrow technical category.
Another major benefit is the ability to use an expert familiar
with the cultural norms of an industry, which is something few
judges understand or consider in rendering an opinion. Expert
procedures include the substantive and decision making
categories in the ADR continuum.
7. Parties want a Final Third Party Decision
Certain cases require a final decision by a neutral.
Although only the ASBCA's small claims procedure allows a
binding decision by a neutral, several procedures call for a
final definitive opinion by a neutral. These opinions
theoretically have credibility because they provide a
reasonably accurate picture of how a litigant would fare in
the court. This characteristic is found in cases which need
early settlement because of internal or external agency
pressure to finish the case, or in cases where both parties
are totally unable to come to a mutual decision, but still
wish to avoid the courts.
8. Control of Outcome is Desirable
Some disputes are resolved more effectively when the
parties make the final decision rather than relying on a third
party to make the decision or render a final opinion. Most
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of the allowable ADR processes let disputing parties make the
final decision, but some rely heavily on a third party
opinion. Cases which require the solution be crafted by the
parties, rather than just given to the parties need to use the
negotiation based processes, such as facilitation or mini-
trials.
9. Case is Based Solely on Fact
Certain cases are based solely on a dispute about the
facts. Many cases in DoD have this characteristic. For
example, many times the dispute is not whether the contractor
is entitled to payment, but how much the entitlement should
be. Other disputes center on the meaning of specific
technical terms in the contract or different interpretations
of data. Often, all other things being equal, the case is
best suited for substantive or decision making ADR techniques
which use technical experts.
10. Case is Based Solely on Legal Issues
This characteristic is similar to those based solely
on fact. Certain cases in DoD hinge on the interpretation of
the law, such as differences on the meaning of precedent. If
the case lends itself to ADR, the opinion of a neutral legal
expert is helpful, such as a settlement judge or an arbitrator
trained in the law.
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11. Case is Based on Mixed Fact and Law
Cases such as these center on a mixture of legal and
factual interpretation problems. These cases require ADR
procedures which provide expert neutrals and /or participants
skilled in determining both fact and law. Mini-trials are
well suited to this type of case.
12. Integrative Appraoch is Needed
Certain cases revolve around more than just the face
issues. Many claims appear to be a dispute over a simple fact
or point of law, but are really disputes based on unspoken
hidden interests or values of the parties. Resolution of the
spoken issues will solve the claim but not the problem, which
may become a recurring problem throughout the life of the
contract. However, resolution of the hidden interests or
value conflicts will often solve the problem permanently.
Negotiation based ADR procedures have the potential
to solve these types of disputes more effectively than the
procedures which key in on issues only. Once the
determination has been made that the claim involves hidden
agendas which have some validity, ADR procedures such as
negotiation, mediation and facilitation should be examined.
13. Witness Credibility
Certain cases hinge on establishing the credibility
of witnesses. If this is an important attribute of the case,
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the literature suggests strongly that the mini-trial not be
used, since it does not allow effective cross examination.
14. Unequal Power
In certain cases, the parties have unequal resources
to apply to an ADR procedure. As examples, the parties may
be unequal in funding, economic leverage or expertise. In
these cases, ADR procedures which require the parties to work
out a solution may favor the more powerful party. More formal
processes may be more appropriate in these cases.
15. Value of the Claim is High
The cost of certain processes is high compared to the
cost of others. If the potential settlement involves a large
amount of money, certain ADR procedures are cost effective,
because they would be very expensive to litigate. For
example, the mini-trial is very effective, but is much more
costly than non-binding arbitration. Agency definitions of
'high value' range from $250,000 to $1,000,000 as cutoffs.
16. Value of the Claim is Low
Alternately, the low cost of some claims requires a
low cost, routine procedure which does not tie up a great deal
of senior time, or agency expertise and funds. These types
of disputes are better solved by more formal third party





High Volume of Similar or Routine issues
Certain contracts or contract types may have similar
issues come up again and again. These issues are basically
the same, with slight variations. These cases may be better
suited to standard routine processes such as the small claims
procedure or non-binding arbitration.
18. Issues are Unclear
Some contract disputes involve issues which are not
clear to the disputants. Often, the adversarial process
creates a number of side issues which obscure the real heart
of the dispute. Certain ADR processes force the parties to
concentrate on what is important, and help discard the
superfluous issues. One way is to limit preparation time and
presentation time, forcing the parties to concentrate on only
key issues, such as mini-trials. Another way is to use
processes that give the parties an opinion on the validity of
the issues, forcing the parties to reevaluate what is truly
important.
19. Parties are Hostile
In many disputes, hostility is so deep that it may
seem the only way to proceed is to go to court. This
hostility is often complicated by a lack of trust, and
misunderstandings about the other party. However, if these
cases are adjudicated, the parties will continue to have an
adversarial relationship.
20. Polarized Positions
Sometimes, the disputing parties are deeply entrenched
in their positions. They may be talking, and may even still
be friendly, but each side is convinced they are correct. In
such cases, ADR techniques which allow a neutral to provide
an independent opinion or force the parties to reexamine their
positions are helpful.
21. Need to Use Confidential Information Without
Disclosure
In some cases, it would be valuable to provide a third
party neutral with information which would not be directly
shared with the disputing party. This is particularly
relevant when interest or value based issues are part of the
dispute. In mediation, and mediation based processes, the
mediator can receive confidential information to assist her
in understanding the position of a party.
22. Dispute is in Early Stages
One of the main reasons for using ADR is the potential
cost savings over formal adjudication. Some ADR processes are
much more cost effective in the early stages because trial
preparation costs are still low. ADR techniques developed to
provide one last shot at settlement before trial are not
appropriate for use in the early stages of a dispute.
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23. Parties have Reached a Communication Impasse
For any number of reasons, disputing parties may
ultimately reach a point where they cannot communicate. At
that point, without third party assistance, the dispute will
go to court. Alternately, negotiations may resume with third
party intervention such as mediation or advisory mediation.
24. Parties Cannot Select a Process
This criterion is when the parties have areas they can
agree on but do not know how to start negotiating or what
process to use. In these cases, only process assistance is
needed, not substantive assistance. This criterion basically
lends itself to facilitation and mediation.
25. Parties Have Known Areas of Agreement
If the disputing parties have areas they basically
agree on, the dispute has potential for negotiation based
procedures. This goes back to the integrative method of
problem solving, where the thrust of the negotiations is to
solve a problem and come up with a mutually satisfactory
answer.
26. Parties Require Procedural and Advisory
Assistance
A case which requires procedural assistance in the
form of mediation may also potentially require an advisory
opinion. This is appropriate in cases where the parties may
have problems reaching a solution, and want an additional
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procedure as a safety net. The additional advisory procedure
will provide the parties with a reason to maintain
negotiations, without resorting to the courts if the mediation
breaks down. ADR methods like advisory mediation or
settlement conferences, which start as mediation but can lead
to advice may be used in such cases.
27. Lack of Negotiation Expertise
If one or both parties lack the skill to negotiate
effectively, unassisted negotiations are probably
inappropriate. In these cases, some form of procedural or
substantive assistance may help the parties reach a
satisfactory agreement.
D. MATCHING CRITERIA WITH METHODS
This section will match the specific criteria to
appropriate ADR methods using tables. Table 1 shows a matrix
of ADR techniques matched to criteria. This table represents
only the initial compilation of data. References showing the
sources of the data are provided in Appendix B.
Table 1 matches criteria with methods. The ADR methods
are presented in order as cooperative methods, procedural
methods, substantive methods and non-binding assistance. This
is the order presented in the continuum given in chapter III.
Each positive sign means that one literature source
recommended the method be used if the criteria was present.
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Each negative sign means that one literature source
recommended the method not be used if the criterion was
present. Blanks show no data were found. In some cases, the
literature was divided between a positive or negative match.
These data are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows certain methods have a great many
matches, and other methods have almost no matches. This
could mislead the reader to assume that one method is heavily
preferred over another. Although certain criteria probably
do favor some processes more than others, this cannot be
determined from the table.
Weighting the criteria and ranking its impact on process
selection was beyond the scope of this thesis, for the
following reason. The data were collected by reviewing
available literature in the field. Certain ADR methods have
been around a long time, and conseguently are written about
extensively. Other methods are relatively new and have not
been as well documented. For example, mediation and
negotiation are established methods, while dispute resolution
panels were only recently developed as a process. Therefore,
the literature will show many more matches for mediation than
the dispute panels on a criterion which favors both.
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TABLE 1 . CRITERIA
CRITERIA NEG FAC MED MT DRP ADM FF. SC NBA BAP
Precedent/Public Norm (D- (D- (2)- (5)- (D- (2)- (D- (2)- (7)- (D-
Willing lo use ADR (6) + (2) + (4) + (4) + (2) + (2) + (2) + (2)+ (2) + (2) +
Claims w/out Merit (0- (D- (D- (D- (D- (D- (D- (D- (D- (D-
Privacy Need <3) + (D + (8) + (6) + (D+ (D + (3) + (D+ (7) + (D +
Lowered Costs (2) + (2) + (7) + (T) + (2 + ) (5) + (3) + (3) + (8) + (3) +
Court Outcome Risky (D + (D + (D + (D + <D + (D+ CD+ («) + (D + (1)+
Complex Issues (D + (D- (D + (3) + (8) + (i) + (D + (D-
Multiple Parties (D- (2) + (5) + (l)- (3) + (D- (D+ (D + (D- (2)-
Continual Relationship <3) + (D+ (6) + (4) + (D + (D +
Need for Timeliness (4) + CD- (4)-(2) + (3) + (3) + (2) + (D + (9) + (5) +
Need lo Control Process <5) + (D + (4) + (5) + (D + (D + (3) + (D-
Technical Expertise (D- (2) + (3) + (6) + (D+ (10) +
Need Neutral Final Dec. (3) + (2) +
Need lo Control Outcome (2) + (1)+ (4) + (2) + (D + (D + (2)- (D-
Fact Based (0 + (5)+ (3) + (6) + (2) + (D +
Legally Based (»)- (4)- (D- (0 +
Mixed Law & Fact Based (5) +
Need Integrative Approach (9) + (D + (9) + (5)+ (D- (7) + (D- (2) +
Question Witness Credibility (D- (5)-
Unequal Power (4)- (D- (4)- (2)- (D + (D +
Claim Value High (6) +
Claim Value Low (2) + (3)- (0 + (2) + (6) + (3) +
Routine High Volume (D + (4) + (D +
Unclear Issues (D + (D +
Parties Hostile (2)- (0- (4) + (D- (2) + (D + (2) +
Positions Polarized (D- (3)- (8) + 0) + (D + (2) + (4) + (3) + (D +
Confidential Information (D + (4) +
Early Stage of Dispute (D + (6) + (3) +
Communication Impasse (3)- (D + (3) + (3) + (0+
Cannot Select Process (3) + C2)+
Known Agreement Areas (2) + (2) +
Need Procedural and Substantive
Assistance
(3) + (3) +
Lack Negotiating Expertise (2)- (D + (2) + (D + (D + (D + (D + (D + (D + <„ +
represents the same number of plus or n
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The next step in the analysis was to take the data and
eliminate the number of ( + ) and (-) signs in each block.
Since the number of matches did not rank order choice of
method, as explained above, simplifying the data provided
easier analysis of the tables.
Each block was given one character. These were:
1. A ( + ) meant the criterion favored the method.
2. A (-) meant the criterion did not favor the
method. Its presence signaled the method should
not be selected.
3. A (D) meant there was dissent in the literature
concerning the presence of the criterion. Some
literature stated the criterion showed the method
should be selected and some literature showed non-
selection was favored.
4. An (N) meant there was no data found that linked
the criterion with the method.
The simplified data are presented in Table 2.
The next step was to split the first six criteria from
the rest of the criteria. These were the need for precedent,
the parties 1 willingness to use ADR, meritless claims, the
need for privacy, lowered costs using ADR and an analysis that
a court outcome is too risky.
They were separated from the data since they assist in
choosing ADR versus traditional adjudication methods, rather
than choosing a specific ADR method. These criteria occurred
in the literature. However, they were presented as
characteristics which affected ADR selection overall, rather
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TABLE 2. SIMPLIFIED CRITERIA
CRITERIA NEG FAC MED MT DRP \DM FF 5C NBA BAP
Precedent/Public Norm
Willing to use ADR + + + + + + + + + +
Claims w/oul Merit
Privacy Need + + + + + +
'
+ + + +
Lowered Costs + + + + + + + + + +
Court Outcome Risky + + + + + + + + + +
Complex Issues D + + + N N + N D
Multiple Parties + D D N N + N D
Continual Relationship + + + + + + N N N N
Need for Timeliness + D + + f N + + +
Need to Control Process + + + + N + N + D N
Technical Expertise N N + + N + + + N
Need Neutral Final Dec. N N N N N N N N + +
Need to Control Outcome + * + + N + N +
Fact Based N N + + + N + N + +
Legally Based N N N N + N N
Mixed Law & Fact Based N N N + N N N N N N
Need Integrative Approach + + + + + + N N
Qucsiion Witness Credibility N N N N N N N N
Unequal Power N N N N + +
Claim Value High N N N + N N N N N N
Claim Value Low N N + + N + N + +
Routine High Volume N N N N + N N N + +
Unclear Issues N + N + N N N N N N
Parties Hostile D + N N + N + N
Positions Polarized + + + N + + + +
Confidential Information N + + N N N N N N N
Early Stage of Dispute + N N + + N N N N N
Communication Impasse + + + N + N N N N
Cannot Select Process N + + |N N N N N N N
Known Agreement Areas + N + |n N N N N N N
Need Procedural and Substantive Assistance N N N |n N N + N N
Lack Negotiating Expertise 1 + |* + + + + + +
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than specific method selection. These data are shown
separately in Figure 2. These criteria do not occur in any
subsequent tables.
The next step was to divide the data into positive,
negative and undecided tables. In each table, only the
criteria with a positive, negative or undecided match was
listed. This allows the contracting officer to see the
different types of matches at a glance. Table 3 lists
positive criteria, Table 4 lists negative criteria, and Table
5 lists criteria which have positive and negative matches in
the same block.
The criteria for each table were listed from those which
occurred most frequently to those which occurred least
frequently. For example, if a criterion matched seven methods
positively, it was listed before one which matched one method
positively.
Additionally, the different methods were reordered
slightly. Specifically, the substantive processes were
ordered differently to show the more integrative processes
such as advisory mediation before the less integrative
processes like factfinding. This regrouping helped show
certain patterns in the data more clearly. These data are
presented in Table 3, 4 and 5.
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CHARACTERISTIC USE
Need Precedent/Public Norm No
Willingness to Use ADR Yes
Claim has no Merit No
Need for Privacy Yes
ADR will Lower Costs Yes
Outcome in Court Risky Yes
Figure 2. Characteristics to Assist in Choosing ADR
or Adjudication
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TABLE 3. CRITERIA USED TO SELECT ARD METHODS
CRITERIA NEG FAC MED MT DRP ADM FF SC NBA BAP
LACK NEGOTIATING EXPERTISE + + + + f +' + +
NEED FOR TIMELINESS + + + + + + +
POLARIZED POSITIONS + + + + + + +
CONTROL OF OUTCOME + + + + + +
CONTROL OF PROCESS + + + + + +
CONTINUAL RELATIONSHIP + t + + + +
INTEGRATIVE APPROACH + + + + + +
FACT BASED + + + + + +
TECHNICAL EXPERTISE + + + + +
CLAIM VALUE LOW + + + + 4
COMPLEX ISSUES + + + +
COMMUNICATION IMPASS + + + +
ROUTINE HIGH VOLUME + + +
PARTIES HOSTILE + + +
EARLY STAGE DISPUTE + + +
MULTIPLE PARTIES + +
NEUTRAL FINAL DECISION + +
UNEQUAL POWER + +
UNCLEAR ISSUES + +
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION + +
CANNOT SELECT PROCESS + +
KNOWN AGREEMENT AREAS + +
NEED PROC/SUB ASSIST. + +
LEGALLY BASED +
MLXED LAW AND FACT +
CLAIM VALUE HIGH
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TABLE 4. CRITERIA USED TO DELETE ADR METHODS












LACK OF NEGOTIATING EXPERTISE
NEED FOR TIMELINESS
TABLE 5. DIVIDED CRITERIA
CRITERIA NEG FAC MED MT DRP ADM FF SC NBA BAP
COMPLEX ISSUES D D
MULTIPLE PARTIES D D D
NEED FOR TIMELINESS D
CONTROL OF PROCESS D
PARTIES HOSTILE D
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The 10 ADR procedures could be grouped into categories
based on certain criteria. These categories are listed below:
1. Integrative procedures - These were the
negotiation/mediation based procedures which had
the potential for integrative problem solving.
They included negotiation, facilitation,
mediation, mini-trials, advisory mediation and
the settlement conference.
2. Unassisted procedures - There was only one
procedure which did not use a third party. This
was negotiation. (Occasionally the mini-trial
may be conducted without assistance, but this is
less common than the assisted mini-trial.)
3
.
Procedural procedures - These were the procedures
where the neutral helped mostly with process.
They were mediation and facilitation.
4. Substantive procedures - These were the procedures
where the neutral helped with the legal and or
factual issues of substance. They were the mini-
trial, advisory mediation, the settlement
conference, dispute resolution boards, and fact-
finding.
5. Advisory procedures - These were procedures where
the neutral delivers a decision. The decision is
not crafted by the parties. The one non-binding
process in this category is non-binding
arbitration, and the one binding process is the
summary ASBCA process.
6. Procedural/substantive assistance procedures -
These were the substantive procedures which were
primarily mediation based, but the parties have
the ability to receive a specific opinion from
the neutral concerning their case. They were
advisory mediation and the settlement conferences.
7 Factual procedures - These were the substantive
procedures which rely on a factual report provided
by a chosen expert (s). They were the dispute
resolution panel and fact-finding.
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In summary, the ADR methods may be conceptually
categorized several ways. First, they can be broadly divided
into integrative and non-integrative procedures. The groups
may be further divided in the continuum categories referenced
in Chapter III, including cooperative decision making,
procedural methods, substantive methods, and advisory non-
binding and binding methods. Finally, the substantive
category may be broken into the mini-trial as a stand alone
process, procedural/substantive methods and factually based
methods.
The criteria showed some rough trends based on Table 3.
These trends were developed by visually screening the data
tables. There were no general trends for the negative tables.
The positive table trends are listed below:
1. Four criteria tended to support the choice of the
negotiation/mediation based techniques. These
were the need to control outcome, the need for an
integrated approach, the need to control the
process and the existence of a continuing
relationship. This does not assume that all
dispute negotiations will be integrative. It
merely shows that if the need to problem solve and
come up with mutually acceptable solutions is
inherent in the conflict, methods such as
negotiation, mediation and mini-trials are better
suited to the dispute.
2. There were trends for factually based disputes.
Understandably, those processes which were geared
to factual research or advice, predominantly
dispute boards and fact-finding, matched the fact-
based, technically oriented disputes.
3
.
Certain criteria showed a preference for selecting
the more formal, factual procedures over the
integrative procedures. These included fact-based
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claims, low value claims, those which were routine
or high volume, those requiring a final decision
and those where the parties had a power
inequality.
Another group of criteria tended towards selection
of negotiation and the procedural methods,
facilitation and mediation. The procedural
methods showed a positive match with the criteria
of the inability to select a process and the need
to exchange confidential information. Negotiation
and mediation were favored if there were known
areas of agreement.
One characteristic set two procedures apart. This
was the need for both procedural and substantive
advice, which attempted to blend the advantages
of mediation with advisory opinions. This
characteristic positively matched selection of
both the settlement conferences (for legal advice)
and advisory mediation.
The mini-trial had the highest number of favorable
criteria, possibly because it combines the
elements of mediation, negotiation and substantive
assistance. In fact, it is the only procedure
recommended for high value, mixed law and fact
disputes.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter presented 3 3 case criteria. They were
divided into criteria which are generic to all ADR selections
over the traditional methods and those which match specific
ADR methods.
The criteria were placed into a general table which
matched them to 10 ADR methods. The data were then reworked
to make it meaningful. Several tables were generated to show
positive, negative and dual matches of criteria with method.
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Then the data were evaluated to identify general trends
between the methods and the criteria.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS ON RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following are the conclusions on the subsidiary
research questions.
1. What are the recognized ADR methods and their




What are the key criteria of disputes that must
be considered when making the choice on an
appropriate ADR methods? The key criteria are:
a. The case requires the setting of
precedent or public standards.
b. The contractor and the Government are
willing to use ADR.
c. The claim is without merit.
d. There is a need for privacy.
e. The costs are lowered by using an ADR
method.
f. The projected court outcome is risky.
g. The case is complex.
h. There are more than two parties involved.
i. There is a continual relationship.
j. There is a need for timely resolution.
k. The parties want to control the process.
1. There is a need for technical expertise.
m. There is a need for an expert final decision.
n. The parties want to control the outcome.
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The dispute is based on fact.
p. The dispute is based on legal issues.
q. The dispute is based on mixed fact and
legal issues.
The parties need an integrative approach.
There is a problem with witness credibility.
The parties are unequal in power.
The claim value is high.
The claim value is low.
The contract has a number of routine,
high volume claims.
The issues in dispute are unclear.
The parties are hostile.
Positions are polarized.
aa. The parties need to use confidential
information without exchanging it.
bb. The dispute is in the early stages.
cc. There is a communication breakdown.
dd. The parties are willing to negotiate but
can't decide on the process.
ee. There are known areas of agreement.
ff. The parties need assistance in
communicating as well as substantive
assistance.
gg. There is a lack of negotiation expertise.





Potential for integrative solutions
Flexible
Most common form ADR
2. Facilitation Voluntary
Non-binding
Use of neutral for process assistance
No opinions or advice given
Negotiation based
3. Mediation • Voluntary
• Non-binding
• Use of neutral for process
Use of neutral for alternative options
Emphasis on acceptable solutions
4. Mini-trials Voluntary
Non-binding
Uses evidence hearing then negotiation
Senior executive involvement
May require discovery





Panel of experts hear case
Panel used at beginning of dispute
6. Advisory mediation Voluntary
Non-binding
Attempt to use mediation first
Mediator gives opinion on request
7. Fact-finding Voluntary
Non-binding
Use of expert neutral
Provides expert report or opinion
Emphasis on technical expertise
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8. Settlement conference - Voluntary
- Non-binding
- Use of judge as mediator and advisor





Use of expert to provide opinion






Use of abbreviated ASBCA hearing
Judge decides with no appeal
11. Binding arbitration Voluntary
Binding
Illegal in DoD
Formal hearing w/ binding decision
12. Mediation-Arbitration - Voluntary
- Binding
- Illegal in DoD
- Parties initially mediate
- Arbitrator decides case if mediation
breaks down
- May use same or different persons for
the mediation and arbitration
13. Private judging Voluntary
Binding
Illegal in DoD
Referred to private neutral by court
rule
Case tried in front of neutral
14. Summary jury trial Voluntary
Non-binding
Not applicable to DoD cases
Mock trial held w/ non-binding jury
recommendation
15. Ombudsman Voluntary
Appointed investigator for complaints





- Parties and agencies negotiate on
rulemaking
- Not applicable to contract cases
17. Neighborhood justice
centers
• Voluntary or mandatory
Used to solve local neighborhood cases
using a variety of methods.




- Prior to disputes, decide on how to
settle disputes
- Not applicable to this thesis
Figure 3. ADR Methods and Their Characteristics
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3 . What are the best methods to use given specific









h. Dispute resolution panel
i. Non-binding arbitration
j . Summary ASBCA procedures
The positive and negative criteria for each specific
method are as follows:
CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING SPECIFIC ADR METHODS
ADR METHOD CRITERIA
1. Negotiation Positive - outcome control
Positive - timeliness
Positive - integrated approach
Positive - process control
Positive - continuing relationship
Positive - early stages of dispute
Positive - known areas of agreement
Negative - unequal power
Negative - communication impasse
Negative - hostility
Negative - lack negotiating expertise
Negative - polarized positions
Negative - multiple parties
2. Facilitation Positive - outcome control
Positive - integrated approach
Positive - process control
Positive - continuing relationship
Positive - complex issues
Positive - multiple parties
Positive - help in selection process
Positive - confidential information
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - communication impasse
Positive - unclear issues
Negative - unequal power
Negative - hostility
Negative - polarized positions
Negative - timeliness
Mediation Positive - outcome control
Positive - polarized positions
Positive - integrated approach
Positive - process control
Positive - fact based
Positive - continuing relationship
Positive - low value
Positive - complex issues
Positive - help in selection process
Positive - confidential information
Positive - known agreement
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - communication impasse
Negative - unequal power
Negative - legally based
Negative - witness credibility
Negative - technical expertise
4. Mini-trials Positive - outcome control
Positive - timeliness
Positive - polarized positions
Positive - integrated approach
Positive - process control
Positive - fact based
Positive - technical expertise
Positive - continuing relationship
Positive - complex issues
Positive - early stages dispute
Positive - high value
Positive - mixed law and fact
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - communication impasse
Positive - parties hostile
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Positive - unclear issues
Negative - legally based
Negative - low value
Negative - witness credibility
Negative - unequal power
5. Advisory mediation Positive - outcome control
Positive - timeliness
Positive - integrated approach
Positive - process control
Positive - continuing relationship
Positive - proc/subst. assistance
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - communication impasse
Settlement
conference
Positive - outcome control
Positive - timeliness
Positive - polarized positions
Positive - integrated approach
Positive - process control
Positive - technical expertise
Positive - proc/subst. assistance
Positive - legally based
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
7 . Dispute resolution
panel
Positive - timeliness
Positive - polarized positions
Positive - fact based
Positive - technical expertise
Positive - continuing relationship
Positive - early stages of dispute
Positive - routine, high volume
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - claim value low
Negative - legally based
Negative - integrated approach
8. Fact-finding Positive - polarized positions
Positive - fact based
Positive - technical expertise
Positive - low value
Positive - complex issues
Positive - multiple issues
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - parties hostile




Positive - polarized positions
Positive - technical expertise
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Positive - fact based
Positive - low value
Positive - neutral final decision
Positive - routine, high volume
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - parties hostile
Positive - unequal power
Negative - outcome control
Summary ASBCA Positive - timeliness
procedures Positive - polarized positions
Positive - fact based
Positive - low value
Positive - neutral final decision
Positive - routine, high volume
Positive - lack of negotiation expertise
Positive - unequal power
Negative - outcome control
Negative - multiple parties
Figure 4. Criteria for Choosing Specific ADR Methods
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B. RECOMMENDED GUIDE FOR CONTRACTING OFFICERS
The following steps will assist a contracting official in
choosing the best ADR method for a given case.
1. Evaluate the situation concerning the particular
claim in question. The following questions may
help:
a. What are the organizational policies and
procedures you must work with when
resolving claims?
b. How experienced are you and your
personnel in settling claims out of
court?
c. What do you want to accomplish with the
claim settlement?
d. How good is your relationship with the
contractor?
e. What are the environmental factors which
impact on the claim settlement? These
may include such items as fund
availability, whether the claim impacts
on other contracts or any other factor




List the criteria which apply to the case from
those developed in this thesis. These criteria
are listed on page 125 of this chapter. The
evaluation of the situation, accomplished in step
1, should be used to help establish the criteria.
For example, if the contracting officer has little
time to spend on the dispute, he should include
the need for timely resolution as one of his
criterion.
3. Using the six criteria given in Figure 2 (page
118) , decide whether the case should be
adjudicated traditionally or ADR should be used.
These criteria are:
a. The case requires precedent standards be
set.
b. The parties are willing to use ADR.
c. The claim is without merit.
d. There is a need for privacy.
e. The costs are lowered by using an ADR
method.
f. The projected court outcome is risky.
If it is decided to go a traditional route, the analysis is
basically over.
4. If the decision is made to use ADR, assign a
relative priority to the case criteria based on
your organization's policies and realistic
environmental factors. This makes it easier to
choose or delete certain methods.
For example, the contracting officer has a claim from a
small business which has been providing a replacement spare.
The contractor and the contracting officer disagree on the
technical meaning of a certain contractual requirement, and
the contractor has claimed he will need $20,000 to adjust the
contract to the Government's satisfaction. The Government's
technical people and the contractor are becoming openly
hostile with one another, since this is the 5th claim in as
many months, and the contract has 5 months left to run. The
contractor has stated he does not trust the Government.
The contracting officer decides the criteria which apply
to the case include: the need for technical expertise, the
fact there is a continuing relationship, the presence of
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hostile parties, the low value of the claim and the fact that
both he and the contractor want control of the outcome. The
contracting officer decides that the most important issue is
to improve relationships with the contractor, to prevent
future claims. Therefore, the criterion of a continuing
relationship is ranked higher than the other criteria, and
will be weighted more heavily in method selection. The second
most important criterion is the low value of the claim,
because the contracting officer does have to account for how
he spends his resources relative to what is accomplished.
5. Once you have the criteria rankings based on your
case, use the tables to help select an appropriate
ADR method. First, using Table 3 (page 119)
,
select the ADR methods which are appropriate based
on positive criteria. You may use the trends
listed on pages 122-123 to help select groups of
methods. However, specific methods must
ultimately be chosen from the groups based on the
data from the tables.
For example, the case above shows the negotiation/
mediation based methods are recommended for outcome and
process control, and continuing relationships, while the
need for expertise and the low value claims are
recommended for dispute resolution boards, fact-finding,
non-binding arbitration and summary procedures. The
presence of hostility, however, shows only mini-trials
recommended on the chart.
6. The next step is to use Table 4 (page 120) to
evaluate the remaining ADR methods to see which
are inappropriate given certain criteria. The
mini-trial is not recommended when the claim value
is low. So in the example, the mini-trial is
deleted. Non-binding arbitration and summary
procedures are deleted, since they are not
recommended when outcome control is required.
Negotiation and facilitation are not favored when
hostility is present.
136
7. Use Table 5 (page 120) to resolve additional
questions about criteria and a preferred method.
This table will show if certain experts believed
it to be an appropriate or inappropriate method,
even if there was not consensus in the field. For
the example, the criterion of hostile parties was
only recommended for the mini-trial. However,
Table 5 shows that mediation may be appropriate




Select the methods based on the table data and
internal priorities. Keep in mind some of these
processes are flexible, and may be adjusted to
accommodate certain cases. Finishing the example,
the contracting officer knows that the favored
methods are now mediation, and to a lesser extent,
fact-finding, and the dispute resolution board.
He therefore decides to have the claim mediated,
but discusses limiting the time with the
contractor. He also recommends the use of a fact-
finder to give a report on the technical
interpretation of the requirement if the mediation
becomes stalled. The report could be used for
further mediation.
Using these steps, the contracting officer can narrow
method selection down to one or two appropriate criteria. As
a note, the contracting officer must apply some judgment,
since this is a guide, not a formula.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The following are three recommendations for additional
research in ADR.
1. One concern expressed by the Navy is the
reluctance of the defense contractor in using ADR
techniques. Research is needed to decide if
contractors are reluctant to use certain methods,
why they have this reluctance and what procedures
and modifications to the rules would help overcome
the reluctance.
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A second concern, expressed by the Navy, is how
to provide incentives for the contracting officers
to use ADR. Currently, ADR programs are top
driven. Research is needed to find out how the
field contracting officers feel about using ADR,
and what needs to be done to encourage them to
voluntarily use the program. For example, how
could the reward structure reinforce using ADR.
The ADR field is potentially appropriate for the
development of an expert system to assist in
deciding which methods are best suited for a
particular case. The research could potentially
automate what this thesis did manually.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided the conclusions to the initial
research questions. Then it recommended a guide for the
contracting officer to use to make an appropriate choice of
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